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ABSTRACT
GORRELL P. CHEEK. User centric policy management. (Under the direction of
DR. MOHAMED SHEHAB)
Internet use, in general, and online social networking sites, in particular, are ex-
periencing tremendous growth with hundreds of millions of active users. As a result,
there is a tremendous amount of privacy information and content online. Protect-
ing this information is a challenge. Access control policy composition is complex,
laborious and tedious for the average user. Usable access control frameworks have
lagged. Acceptance / use of available frameworks is low. As a result, policies are
only partially configured and maintained. Or, they may be all together ignored. This
leads to privacy information and content not being properly protected and potentially
unknowingly made available to unintended recipients.
We overcome these limitations by introducing User Centric Policy Management – a
new paradigm of semi-automated tools that aid users in building, recommending and
maintaining their online access control policies. We introduce six user centric policy
management assistance tools: Policy Manager is a supervised learning based mech-
anism that leverages user provided example policy settings to build classifiers that
are the basis for auto-generated policies. Assisted Friend Grouping leverages proven
clustering techniques to assist users in grouping their friends for policy management
purposes. Same-As Subject Management leverages a user’s memory and opinion of
their friends to set policies for other similar friends. Example Friend Selection pro-
vides different techniques for aiding users in selecting friends used in the development
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of access control policies. Same-As Object Management leverages a user’s memory
and perception of their objects for setting policies for other similar objects. iLayer is
a least privilege based access control model for web and social networking sites that
builds, recommends and enforces access control policies for third party developed
applications.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of these policy management assistance tools, we
implemented a suite of prototype applications, conducted numerous experiments and
completed a number of extensive user studies. The results show that User Centric Pol-
icy Management is a more usable access control framework that is effective, efficient
and satisfying to the user, which ultimately improves online security and privacy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Online social networking sites are experiencing tremendous adoption and growth.
The internet and online social networks, in particular, are a part of most people’s
lives in the US. Although, growth is expected to slow; eMarketer reports that over
150 million US internet users will interface with at least one social networking site
per month [16]. That is approximately 64% of all internet users – see Figure 1.
Figure 1: US social network users and penetration
eMarketer also reports that approximately 90% of internet users ages 18-24 and
82% of internet users ages 25-34 will interact with at least one social networking site
per month. This trend is increasing for all age groups – see Figure 2. As the young
population ages, they will continue to leverage social media in their daily lives. In
addition, new generations will come to adopt the internet and online social networks.
These technologies have become and will continue to be a vital component of our
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social fabric which we depend on to communicate, interact and socialize.
Figure 2: US social network user penetration, by age
Not only are there a tremendous amount of users online, there is also a tremendous
amount of user profile data (e.g., name, birthday, education, work history, etc.) and
content (e.g., web links, notes, photos, etc.) online. For example, Facebook touts
that they have over one billion active monthly user [17]. Each of these users has an
average of 130 friends and creates over 90 pieces of new content each month. Over
30 billion pieces of content are shared each month between users. This large amount
of content coupled with the significant number of users online makes maintaining
appropriate levels of privacy very challenging.
There have been numerous studies concerning privacy in the online world [9, 33, 39].
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these studies. First, there are varying
levels of privacy controls, depending on the online site. For example, some sites make
available user profile data to the internet with no ability to restrict access. While other
sites limit user profile viewing to just trusted friends. Other studies introduce the
notion of the privacy paradox, the relationship between individual privacy intentions
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to disclose their personal information and their actual behavior [50]. Individuals voice
concerns over the lack of adequate controls around their privacy information while
freely providing their personal data. Other research concludes that individuals lack
appropriate information to make informed privacy decisions [6]. More over, when
there is adequate information, short-term benefits are often opted over long-term
privacy. However, contrary to common belief, people are concerned about privacy
[5, 14]. But, managing ones privacy can be challenging. This can be attributed to
many things, e.g., the lack of privacy controls available to the user, the complexity of
using the controls and the burden associated with managing these controls for large
sets of users.
1.1 Viewer Policy Management
As stated previously, online social networks have grown tremendously in recent
years. Managing access to one’s privacy information and content for all these view-
ers / friends (consumers of user information / content) is quite challenging. Online
social networks provide access controls frameworks. However, these frameworks vary
in capability from very basic coarse-grained sets of access controls with limited flex-
ibility to more fine-grained sets of access controls that are overly cumbersome and
difficult to use. Research has found that managing access to online information (both
privacy and content) is traditionally manual, complex, difficult and time consuming
[15, 33, 39]. As a result, access control frameworks are not widely adopted and,
therefore, users’ information is potentially exposed in unwanted ways [34, 62, 9]. For
example, unintended sharing of content occurs over a third of the time as a result of
relying on default privacy settings [41]. In addition, almost two thirds of the time,
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users’ expectations don’t align with their privacy settings because of the difficulty in
managing them – potentially resulting in unintended information leakage [42].
Additional research points to the long sought after goal and importance of usable
security [8, 36, 66]. But, usability and security often have competing objectives. Ac-
cording to ISO 9241-11 (1998), usability is the “extent to which a product can be
used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction in a specified context of use.” ISO 17799 (2005) states that “security
is achieved by implementing a suitable set of controls... to ensure that the specific
security and business objectives... are met.” How do we build suitable access control
frameworks that are effective, efficient and satisfying to the end user? These frame-
works must adhere to all three criteria. If they are suitable to the end user but don’t
provide effective controls, then security is not achieved. Conversely, access control
frameworks not only have to be effective and efficient, they must also be satisfying.
If they are not, they are unlikely to be used and therefore become ineffective. Saltzer
and Schroeder [56] emphasize the importance of psychological acceptability as a key
protection mechanism design principle. “It is essential that the human interface be
designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the protec-
tion mechanisms correctly. Also, to the extent that the user’s mental image of his
protection goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized.”
Access control frameworks must be easy to use. Users must be able to manage
access to their online information in a simple and intuitive way that aligns with
their intentions. In addition, these frameworks must be designed such that they
adhere to a user’s mental image or model for managing and controlling access to their
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online information. Jones et al. [24] describe mental models as “personal, internal
representations of external reality that people use to interact with the world around
them; [they] are used to reason and make decisions and can be the basis of individual
behaviors.” Specific to access control frameworks, a user’s mental model is their
understanding of how access to their online information is managed and controlled.
It is not necessarily derived from formal instruction or training of the framework.
Even so, the framework’s capabilities should align, as much as possible, to the user’s
mental model. For example, a user’s mental model of an access control policy should
align with how the online social network evaluates that policy. If the user’s intent is
to limit access to a set of sensitive pictures to just family members, the online social
network should evaluate and enforce that policy accordingly. The more alignment
of an access control framework with a user’s mental model, the less likely for policy
errors and unintended information leakage. We believe that User Centric Viewer
Policy Management Assistance Tools need to be placed in the hands of the average
user to assist them in effectively managing access to their online information.
1.2 Application Policy Management
Unfettered and unchecked access of third party applications is another security
vulnerability that puts social networks and their online information at risk. For
example, a hypothetical social networking web site called Social123.com is powered
by a content management system. The administrative user has installed several third
party applications to customize and enhance the social networking site. One installed
application, BdayCalApp, has full access to the database, yet only requires a subset
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of access, e.g., users’ birthdays to be displayed on a calendar. An attacker can target
Social123.com via BdayCalApp to gain access to the login credentials of all of the users
on the social networking site. These credentials are stored in the users table within
the database. A poorly written third party application may find itself vulnerable to a
SQL injection attack which could expose all the tables, including the users table. Even
though BdayCalApp only requires access to the table containing users’ birthdays, all
tables are available to the application and thus increase the risk of compromise and
misuse.
On a popular content management system used to power social networking sites
called Drupal [13], we conducted a study of 412 third party applications in order to
analyze the database calls made by them. Through static analysis, we extracted the
database table accesses made by these applications. In Drupal, database calls are
made by using the db query() function. For every database call, we parsed through
the SQL statement to find the database tables and recorded the results. We found
that applications accessed tables they created and the core tables provided by Drupal.
We also found that third party applications have significantly more access to the
Drupal core tables than what is required. Only 2% of the applications required access
to the sessions table. That leaves 98% who didn’t require access and yet had access
thus leaving the web site vulnerable to session hijacking – see Table 1. Only 7%
of the modules required access to the node revisions and permissions tables leaving
roughly 382 applications (or modules) access to these tables and thus vulnerable to
potential privilege escalation and content compromise attacks. The users table is a
default table that holds basic user information such as user names and passwords.
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Approximately 77% of the applications didn’t need access to this table but did have
access. These are clearly not examples of least privilege [57] and therefore the risk of
compromise increases.
Table 1: Sample of Drupal core database tables
Table Name Table Description Potential Impact % of Modules That
Require Access
sessions Contains user session Session hijacking 2%
information, e.g., userID,
sessionID, user IP address, etc.
users roles Lists the assignments Privilege escalation 5%
between users and roles
node revisions Contains edits / Content compromise 7%
revisions of node content
permissions Lists each user role’s Privilege escalation 7%
permissions
users Contains usernames, Account compromise 23%
passwords, profile
information, etc.
Least privilege based access control for third party developed applications for on-
line social networks is not available. Third party application access control is limited
in capability and the capability that does exist is hard to configure for the average
administrative user. Least privilege based access control frameworks for third party
developed applications are needed. Applications need only be given access to the
objects and resources they require. We believe that administrators need additional
User Centric Application Policy Management Assistance Tools to protect online in-
formation from attacks via third party applications.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS
With the ever increasing number of internet users and content available online,
it a challenging effort in managing access to information. Maintaining an effective
access control policy can be a very complex, laborious and tedious task. As a result,
policies are only partially configured and maintained. Or, they may be all together
ignored. This leads to user data and content not being properly protected and poten-
tially unknowingly made available to unintended recipients, e.g., viewers or “friends”,
third party applications, etc. In general, acceptance and use of access control policy
management mechanisms designed to protect online information is low.
Our research problem is as follows:
Problem Statement: Users, to include administrative users, are not effectively setting
/ managing access control policies in online systems and therefore profile data and
content can potentially be exposed and compromised.
Our hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis Statement: Enhanced user centric policy management mechanisms are
more effective, efficient and satisfying to the user, ultimately improving user security
and privacy over more traditional online policy management approaches.
CHAPTER 3: SOLUTION OVERVIEW
3.1 Overview
There are two primary consumers of online information: viewers and third party
applications – see Figure 3. Viewers are traditionally users of the web / social net-
working site, e.g., “friends”. Viewers access the target user’s (also called the focus
user’s) profile data and content. For example, you are the focus user and your friend
Bob (viewer) reads (consumes) your Facebook user data profile containing your edu-
cation and work history.
Figure 3: User centric policy management overview
Third party applications expand the capabilities and functionalities of web and
social networking sites, of which content management systems (CMS) are used to
build and maintain. Third party applications also consume online information. They
are developed by a different entity other than the primary web or social networking
site. These applications provide services to users and interact with users by combining
and aggregating online information, to include user information. For example, an
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application that provides birthday gift recommendations for friends needs to access
the focus user’s profile and friends’ profiles to access such information as birth dates,
interests and addresses in order to make appropriate birthday gift recommendations.
Web and social networking sites provide sets of Application Programming Interfaces
(API) that enable third party applications to interface and access user profile data
and content. We further discuss these API’s, which we call Social Networks Connect
Services, in Chapter 5.
Access control mechanisms, including their policies, lie between the consumers of
the information and the actual information, refer to Figure 3. User Centric Policy
Management enhances these mechanism. It primarily consists of Policy Management
Assistance Tools with User Centric Characteristics that enable the user to better
manage their access control policies. We argue that these enhanced policy man-
agement mechanisms are more effective, efficient and satisfying directly resulting in
improved privacy and security.
3.1.1 Policy Management Assistance Tools
We introduce Policy Management Assistance Tools which are semi-automated mech-
anisms controlled by the user for aiding in the management of their access control
policies. These tools take input data from three primary sources: 1) user input, 2)
user data, e.g., other user’s profile data, social network structure data, etc. and 3)
application data, e.g., historical access data, etc. Via these semi-automated mecha-
nisms that leverage all available input data, the Policy Management Assistance Tools
assist the user in building, recommending and maintaining their online policies. These
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policies then govern access to their profile data (e.g., name, birthday, education, work
history, etc.) and content (e.g., web links, notes, photos, etc.). – see Figure 4.
Figure 4: User centric policy management model
3.1.2 User Centric Characteristics
Our model takes a user centric view [30, 43, 29]. Whereas, the user has effective
visibility and control in managing access to their online user profile data and content.
User Centric Policy Management has the following characteristic: User in Control,
Ease of Use, Policy Visibility and Readability, Flexibility and Accuracy – see Figure 5.
User in Control: The main premise of user centricity is that the user is in the
center. In the case of User Centric Policy Management, the user is in control, or in
the center, of managing access to their policies. The user is the decision maker in
setting, updating and revoking access to their online information.
Ease of Use: But, putting the user in control of policy management is not enough.
The user needs to be able to manage their policies in an easy, intuitive and effective
way such that they have a consistent experience. Research has shown that com-
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Figure 5: User centric policy management characteristics
plex and laborious policy management mechanisms can lead to ineffective policies.
User Centric Policy Management is characterized by its ease of setting and managing
policies that govern access to online information.
Policy Visibility and Readability: Not only does a policy management solution
have to be easy to use, it must be decipherable. The core component of any access
control mechanism is the policy which governs access. This policy not only must
be available and visible to the user, but it also must be readable. Policies that are
complex and difficult to understand are more likely to be misconfigured resulting in
unintended consequences, e.g., data leakage, etc.
Flexibility: Policy management mechanisms must be flexible to accommodate the
end user’s needs and intentions. User Centric Policy Management creates a balance
between coarse grained and fine grained access control. Traditionally, coarse grained
access control provides few options to the end user. And, fine grained access control,
although extremely flexible in that it provides lots of options and capabilities, is
traditionally overwhelming and complex. User Centric Policy Management strikes a
13
balance between too little flexibility and an overly burdensome policy management
mechanism.
Accuracy: Finally, policy management mechanisms that aid users in governing
access to their online information must be accurate relative to the user’s intentions.
User Centric Policy Management is characterized by its accuracy.
3.2 Viewer Policy Management Assistance Tools
We believe more user centric online social network access control frameworks need
to be placed in the hands of the user to aid them in managing and controlling viewer
access to their privacy information and content. Traditionally, improvements are
made in two areas: 1) changes to the underlying access control model and 2) enhance-
ments to the user interface [55]. We introduce five Policy Management Assistance
Tools that make improvements in both of these areas. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Viewer policy management assistance tools
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Policy Manager: We propose Policy Manager (PolicyMgr) which assists users in
managing access to objects posted to their profiles. Our approach leverages input from
the user, metrics from their social graph, and proven supervised learning techniques
to effectively identify trusted and non-trusted friends relative to a specific object,
e.g., photo. The profile owner provides example policy settings as training sets to
build classifiers that can precisely generate policies for other users in their friend’s
list – identifying them as trusted and non-trusted friends. Furthermore, we explore
the fusion of policy decisions generated by their neighboring friends to enhance the
accuracy of the supervised learning approach. We implemented our framework on
the Last.FM social network. Policy Manager is further detailed in Section 4.1.
Assisted Friend Grouping: We introduce a user assisted friend grouping mecha-
nism that enhances traditional group based policy management approaches. Assisted
Friend Grouping leverages proven social graph clustering techniques to aid users in
grouping their friends more efficiently for privacy policy management purposes. We
found measurable agreement between clusters and user defined relationship groups.
Our approach exhibited user centric characteristics and demonstrated promising re-
sults in assisting users in efficiently grouping and setting expressive policies for their
friends. We implemented a prototype Facebook application of Assisted Friend Group-
ing and conducted an extensive user study. Assisted Friend Grouping is further de-
tailed in Section 4.2.
Same-As Subject Management: We introduce a policy management approach for
online social networks that leverages a user’s memory and opinion of their friends
to set policies for other similar friends, which we refer to as Same-As Subject Man-
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agement. Using a visual policy editor that takes advantage of friend recognition and
minimal task interruptions, Same-As Subject Management demonstrated improved
performance and user centric characteristics over traditional group based policy man-
agement approaches. In addition, users of Same-As Subject Management authored
more conservative policies. We implemented a prototype Facebook application of
Same-As Subject Management and conducted an extensive user study. Same-As
Subject Management is further detailed in Section 4.3.
Example Friend Selection: We introduce two techniques that leverage the user’s
social graph for aiding in the selection of an example friends used in developing
policy templates for Same-As Subject Management. Both techniques reduced policy
authoring time and were positively perceived by users. We implemented a prototype
Facebook application of Example Friend Selection and conducted an extensive user
study. Example Friend Selection is further detailed in Section 4.4.
Same-As Object Management: Most attention, in access control literature, has been
placed on abstracting the complexity of managing large numbers of subjects. More
limited research has focused on the object side of the equation, i.e., how to manage
large sets of objects for the purposes of controlling access. The basic premise of access
control systems is to protect and control access to sensitive resources / assets (i.e.,
objects). Just as subjects are dynamic, so are objects. Objects are created. Their
properties change, e.g., sensitivity level, size, etc. They ultimately are retired or
deleted. Managing the full life-cycle of large numbers of objects can be complex and
difficult.
We introduce a policy management approach for online social networks that lever-
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ages a user’s memory and opinion of their objects to set policies for other similar
objects, which we refer to as Same-As Object Management. Our visual policy editor
is easy to use and aligns with the user’s mental model for managing access to their
online privacy information and content. It demonstrated improved user centric char-
acteristics over traditional grouping based policy management interfaces. Same-As
Object Management also demonstrated improved expressiveness and performance,
in addition to more conservative policies, over more traditional grouping based ac-
cess control models. We implemented a prototype Facebook application of Same-As
Object Management and conducted an extensive user study. Same-As Object Man-
agement is further detailed in Section 4.5.
3.3 Application Policy Management Assistance Tools
We believe that web and social networking site administrators need additional tools
and mechanisms to protect their information assets from attacks via third party appli-
cations. First, we analyze the general framework used by the major social networking
sites for integrating third party applications, which we call Social Networks Connect
Services. Next, we introduce a Policy Management Assistance Tools called iLayer
which manages the accesses of third party applications. See Figure 7.
Social Networks Connect Services: Major social networking sites have rolled out
new services such as Facebook Platform, Google Friend Connect, and MySpaceID. We
call these new services Social Networks Connect Services. Social Networks Connect
Services allow third party sites to develop social applications and extend their services
into the social web without having to build their own social network. This extension
17
Figure 7: Application policy management assistance tools
allows third party sites to access and enrich user data in the social web. We describe
the general framework of Social Networks Connect Services and compare the Facebook
Platform, Google Friend Connect, and MySpaceID services relative to this general
framework. We also present open research security challenges associated with the
expanded use of Social Networks Connect Services. Social Networks Connect Services
is further detailed in Section 5.1.
iLayer: We propose an application access control framework that is based on a least
privilege security model [57]. This framework gives visibility into the accesses that
third party applications request, in addition to aiding and guiding administrators in
making policy decisions. The security policies are set at installation time and are
enforced at run time. The framework adds another layer of protection to the web
site and is an improvement of how content management systems implement access
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control for third party applications. For example, some content management systems
regulate access to third party applications via file permissions, which is cumbersome
and difficult to administer. Administrators would need to analyze the application,
know the intricacies of the CMS platform, and be familiar with the underlying oper-
ating system to effectively set the appropriate file permissions. This is a difficult and
tedious undertaking. With our proposed approach (iLayer), the administrator need
only set the policy at installation time and the framework enforces that policy at run
time.
The iLayer Application Access Control Framework: 1) is based on a least privilege
model, 2) protects web and social networking sites from third party applications and
3) provides administrative users with third party application policy setting function-
ality, including recommendations for policy settings. We implemented a prototype
of our framework and demonstrated its feasibility. iLayer is further detailed in Sec-
tion 5.2.
CHAPTER 4: VIEWER POLICY MANAGEMENT
4.1 Policy Manager
4.1.1 Preliminaries
Social Networks: Users and relationships between users are the core components
of social networks. Each user maintains a user profile and is connected to a set of
friends. We assume friendship is mutual, where if ui is a friend of uj this implies that
uj is also a friend of ui. Each user ui ∈ V maintains a profile Pi which is composed of
N profile attributes, Ai = {ai1, . . . , aiN}. For example, a Facebook user profile includes
attributes such as birthday, location, gender, religion, etc. Users are also able to post
objects such as photos, videos and notes to their profiles to share with other users.
A social network can be modeled as an undirected graph G(V,E) where the set of
vertices V is the set of users and the set of edges E is the set of friendship relationships
between users. The edge (ui, uj) ∈ E implies that users ui and uj are friends. Using
this model for social networks, we leverage the nodal network structural properties
to provide additional user attributes. These attributes include several small world
network metrics such as degree, betweenness, closeness, etc. [47, 10]. Meneely et
al. [45] also use the nodal network structural properties to provide attributes for
predicting code development failure rates. They leverage similar metrics (i.e., degree,
closeness and betweenness) from software developer collaboration networks in their
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model. Social network analysis and, more specifically, the centrality measures of
degree and betweenness have also been used in the study of street gangs [61].
For a user ui, we are able to compute M network metrics Bi = {bi1, . . . , biM}. Each
metric provides different indicators about users in a given social network [71, 48, 47,
32].
For example:
• Degree Centrality: The number of direct friendship connections a user has.
• Betweenness Centrality: The extent to which a node lies between other nodes
in the network; a node with high betweenness has great influence over what
flows, and does not flow, in the network.
• Closeness Centrality: The distance between friends.
• Common Friends: The number of common friends between two users.
• Hyper-link Induced Topic Search (HITS): The measure of importance of a user
based on network structure and friend relationships.
• Eigenvector Centrality: The importance of a friend relative to the friend list.
PageRank is a variation of Eigenvector Centrality.
Each user ui in a social network maintains a collection of user profile attributes
and a set of user friendships of which social network metrics are computed.
Definition 1 (User Profile) The user profile denoted by Pi = {Ai, Bi} for user ui
is characterized by a set of attributes Ai = {ai1, . . . , aiN} and a set of network metrics
Bi = {bi1, . . . , biM}. The attribute ail is a (anil, avil) pair of strings where anil is the
attribute name and avil is the attribute value in a domain D, which also includes the
null value referred to by ⊥. The network metrics Bi follow a similar definition and
their domain is R+.
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Policies in Social Networks: A user ui posting an object O on their profile is allowed
to setup an access control policy to specify which friends are allowed (denied) access
to the posted object. The access control policy is managed and stored by the hosting
social network site. Current social networks allow users to categorize friends into
groups based on relationship, location, institution, family, work, etc. For example,
Orkut has the following default friend groups defined: best friend, family, school and
work. Orkut also allows its users to create new friend groups. Facebook has a similar
capability which they call friend lists. Furthermore, users are able to specify policies
in terms of theses groups. Users are also able to specify exception lists indicating
explicitly which friends should and should not be given access to specific objects.
For example, the Family photo album in Orkut can be restricted to just the Family
friend group while the Graduation photo album is viewable by everyone. We define
an access control policy as:
Definition 2 The access control policy of an object O is defined using two access
control lists, namely the allow list ACL+ and the exception list ACL−, which are sets
of the allowed and the denied users or groups respectively. Access control follows the
closed world assumption, where if access is not explicitly specified, it is assumed to be
not accessible. For an object O given ACL+ and ACL−, a user u is given access to
O iff u ∈ ACL+ and u 6∈ ACL− or in compact form, u ∈ (ACL+ \ ACL−).
4.1.2 Supervised Learning Framework
We investigated the access control mechanisms that govern access of viewers to a
focus user’s profile data and content. We propose Policy Manager (PolicyMgr) – a
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Policy Management Assistance Tool. PolicyMgr assists users in managing access to
objects posted to their profiles. Our approach leverages input from the user, profile
data, metrics from their social graph and proven supervised learning techniques to
effectively identify trusted and non-trusted friends relative to a specific object, e.g.,
photo. The profile owner provides example policy settings as training sets to build
classifiers that can generate policies for other users in their friend’s list – identifying
them as trusted and non-trusted friends. Furthermore, we explore the fusion of pol-
icy decisions generated by their neighboring friends to enhance the accuracy of the
supervised learning approach.
In most social networks, users are allowed to specify simple policies that are based
on the principle of allow and deny, where the user has to decide who to allow and
deny access or who to trust or not. Instead of asking the focus user to decide for each
of her friends who to give access or not, our proposed framework only requires the
focus user to choose the access rights (or label) of α carefully selected users from her
friend’s list. (Note: We refer to the profile owner as the focus user.) Our proposed
framework uses supervised learning mechanisms to decide on the access control policy
settings for the remaining users. The details of our framework are further discussed
below.
In machine learning literature, a classification learning model is a function f that
takes as an input a set of attributes and returns a label or classification, e.g., a
function that can take the user’s age, gender, credit rating and job status and generate
a recommendation to either grant or deny a loan. A supervised learning mechanism
uses training data Θ to learn the function f , which we refer to as fΘ.
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Taking a simple approach to address the policy composition problem would require
each focus user to manually decide on trust and access control settings for each
of his friends. This is a tedious task given that users have on average hundreds of
friends [17, 65]. Instead, the approach we adopt is an enhanced user centric approach,
where the user is required to only provide a small subset of their friends’ permission
mappings. These example permission mappings are used as a training set Θ for the
supervised learning algorithm. Basically, we attempt to learn the mapping function
fΘ : X → Y , where:
1. X is a set of user profile attributes and network metrics {Aj, Bj} describing
user uj.
2. Y is a set of labels {y0, . . . , ym}, in our case it is {trusted, non− trusted}.
3. Θ is the training set, which is a set of labeled friends’ profiles provided by the
user.
Our goal is to learn the function fΘ based on the provided training set Θ. Once
fΘ is learned, we can automatically decide if a user with a given profile is allowed
or denied access. This supervised learning mechanism requires an example data set
to train and guide the generation of the mapping function fΘ. Given a friend uj
with a profile Pj = {Aj, Bj}, the classifier fΘi for user ui assigns the label yl to user
uj provided that this label maximizes the classifier’s confidence or the probability
measure P (uj → yl|Θi) based on the training set Θi.
There are five steps involved in the learning based policy management process –
See Figure 8. In step 1, for each focus user’s friends the profile attributes Aj are
collected and the network attributes Bj are computed based on the generated social
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Data Collection 
• Friends’ profile attributes. 
• Friends’ network attributes.  
User Classifications 
• Get friend trust classifications. 
• Handle missing data attributes. 
• Build training set. 
Build and Compare Different Matching Classifiers 
• Generate a set of different classifiers on the data. 
• Compare classifiers and choose the best based on error thresholds. 
User Clustering and Selection 
• Cluster the friends into  clusters based on the profile attributes. 
• Select from each cluster  friends to be displayed to the profile 
owner for classification.  
Gender 
a1 
... Address 
an 
Degree 
b1 
… Closeness 
bn 
Label 
male  Chicago, IL 1  3 Not Trusted 
male  NY, NY 10  1 Trusted 
female  Dayton, OH 1  3 Not Trusted 
female  Atlanta, GA 2  7 Not Trusted 
male  Atlanta, GA 8  3 Not Trusted 
 
Step 1 
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Classifier Selection and Fusion 
• Select  friends that neighbor the focus user and provide the best labeling 
similarity based on the focus user’s provided training set. 
• Fuse the decisions provided by the selected  friends with the focus user’s 
decisions to enhance the labeling accuracy. 
• Label the remaining friends using the fused classifier. 
Step 5 
Figure 8: Learning based policy management process
graph information. In step 2, the collected attributes {Aj, Bj} are used to cluster
the focus user’s friends into K non-overlapping clusters. The clustering is performed
to ensure that the focus user labels representative members of each of the computed
clusters. We use the k-means clustering algorithm [40]. From each of the clusters,
we randomly select α friends. In step 3, The focus user is then asked to classify
each of the α friends, that is to indicate which of the friends are trusted to access a
specific object and which are not trusted. This implies the classification labels are
selected from the set Y = {y0, y1}, where y0 and y1 are trusted and non-trusted classes
respectively. The labeled α friends are added to the training set Θ. In step 4, the
training set Θ can be used directly to train a classifier. However, there are several
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classifier algorithms and it is crucial to select the classifier that is most suited for
this specific user instance. So, the mechanism we adopt is to train and tune several
classifiers and then compare their performance based on standard cross validation
methods such as n-fold cross validation [72]. Given m classifiers {f 1Θi , . . . , f
m
Θi
}, the
classifier with the highest accuracy is selected, which is denoted as f ∗Θi .
In step 5, the knowledge accumulated by other users in the social network can be
utilized to further enhance the classifier accuracy. It is important in this step to seek
classification advice from other friends who classify users similar to the focus user.
This is referred to as the selection process where β other user classifiers are selected
based on their accuracy in labeling the focus user’s training set Θi. In the fusion
process, the decisions of the selected β classifiers are combined with the decisions of
the focus user’s classifier to classify the remaining focus user’s friends. The details of
this approach are discussed in the following section.
4.1.3 Classifier Selection and Fusion
The inherent advantage of social networks is the ease of sharing of news, photos,
videos and several other data objects among users. We extend this sharing to include
the accommodation of user experiences by leveraging their trained classifiers, where
user uj is able to share their mapping function fΘj with other users. Assume a user ui
would like to leverage the experience of other users in the social network to improve
their mapping function fΘi . We use fΘk to refer to the best classifier f
∗
Θk
for user uk.
Given a user ui and a set of users S = {u1, . . . , un}, the set S can be chosen from
the neighboring trusted friends or from other experienced users in the social network.
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Each user uk in the set S is willing to share their mapping function fΘk to improve
the mapping function of user ui. This translates into two sub-steps: (1) The selection
of β users from the set S that are best fit to help user ui in computing an improved
mapping function, (2) The fusion of the different fΘk functions provided by the β
users with the focus user’s function fΘi .
Definition 3 (Selection) Given a user ui, a set of user trained classifier functions
fS = {fΘ1 , . . . , fΘn}, the training set Θi for user ui and a classifier fitness function
Φ : fΘk ×Θi → <, select the best β classifiers based on the fitness function.
The selection process is based on the fitness function as defined in Definition 3. The
fitness function is a mechanism to rank the classifiers in fS based on their similarity to
the decisions taken by the classifier of user ui. This mechanism attempts to locate the
β classifiers that match the focus user’s perspective. The fitness function tests each
classifier fΘk by labeling the tuples in the training set Θi and computing the vector
[TP, TN, FP, FN ]T , which represents the true positive, true negative, false positive
and false negative respectively. The fitness of fΘk is based on the classifier accuracy
[53, 7], computed as TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+TN
. The β classifiers with the highest fitness are
selected and are denoted by the set Sβ = {fΘ1 , . . . , fΘβ}.
Given the β classifiers, the next step involves fusing the decisions of these classi-
fiers and the decisions generated by the focus user’s classifier (fΘi) to improve the
classification result. We adopt the following classifier fusion algorithms [31]: group
voting, group confidence product and most confident.
After the β classifiers with the highest fitness are selected, an appropriate fusion
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algorithm (of the three listed above) is chosen to fuse the results of the fΘi and the fΘk
functions producing a predicted label, i.e., trusted or non-trusted. This final classifier
function is designated as fβΘ. Note that when the focus user adds new friends, the
generation of the their access rights can be automated based on the available function
fβΘ. Furthermore, as the focus user adds similar objects to their profile, the new
objects can also adopt the same classifier function.
4.1.4 Experimental Results
Last.FM [37] is one of the web’s most popular recommendation and web radio
services providing a social networking platform where friendships have an impact on
what people listen to. Using Last.FM’s public developer API, we implemented a
crawler that was able to collect user profile attributes and friendship relationships.
The crawler was written in Java 1.6; the crawler loads the focus user’s profile infor-
mation, their friends list and stores all the loaded data into a MySQL database. We
collected about 1.6 million user profiles and about 13 million friendship links.
A series of experiments were conducted using a randomly selected subset of the
Last.FM data set, approximately 200 focus users. For each focus user, the following
profile attributes were obtained: Age, Gender and Home Country. We also collected
Shouts, which are posts made by users on their friends’ profiles. In addition, each
focus user’s social graph was built and a series of network metrics were computed on
their respective social graph, which included degree centrality, betweenness centrality,
closeness centrality, common friends, HITS and Eigenvector centrality.
The network metrics for different users were computed using the open source Java
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Universal Network Framework (JUNG) [1]. Following the collection of user data, a
training set Θ was compiled out of a subset of the focus user’s friend set. The overall
friend set was clustered into K clusters leveraging the k-means clustering algorithm.
(Note: We fixed K to two; further experiments are necessary for other values of K.)
The training set Θ was comprised of a percentage α of friends randomly selected from
each cluster. Each user in the training set Θ was labeled as trusted or non-trusted.
The trusted and non-trusted label for each friend in the training set would normally
be applied by the focus user, instead the number of Shouts generated was used as an
indication of trust (Shouts > 5). Further user studies are planned to capture actual
trust labels from the user.
The training set Θ includes, for each friend, a trusted and non-trusted label. The
remaining friend set, called the test set, and the training set are inputs to a variety of
different classifiers. In our experiments, nine different classifiers were trained which
included the following: Naive Bayes, BayesNet, Radial Basis Function Network, K
Star, AD Tree, Support Vector Machine, Naive-Bayes Tree, Random Forest and De-
cision Table. The classifiers were generated using the open source Java WEKA 3.6
library [2]. The classifiers were tested by labeling each friend in the test set as either
trusted or non-trusted based on the users’ profile attributes and network metrics.
The true positive, true negative, false positive and false negatives for each classifier
were recorded. The classifier with the highest accuracy is selected, which is denoted
as f ∗Θi .
Following the section of f ∗Θi , additional classification advice is sought from the focus
user’s friends. For each focus user, β friends (between 10-40) were selected from the
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focus user’s friend set who classify users similarly as the focus user. These β additional
classifiers are fused with the focus users classifiers to label the remaining friends as
either trusted or non-trusted. A future enhancement will include an additional step
giving the focus user an opportunity to review, and possibly re-label, each user and
thus improve the overall classification results.
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Figure 9: PolicyMgr experimental results
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show the accuracy and precision results generated for the
different classifiers using a training set (α) equal to 20% and 10 selected friends (β).
30
Accuracy (or correctness) was previously defined in Section 4.1.3 and precision (or
reproducibility) is defined as TP
TP+FP
. From these results, we are able to show that
without any fusion, the classifier is capable of providing up to 70% accuracy and 55%
precision. Using the different fusion mechanisms, the classifier accuracy improved to
83% and the precision increased to 78%. Based on these results, it is evident that
our fusion based approach improves the classification result with the voting based
approach leading the other fusion mechanisms. Furthermore, the AD Tree classifier
provides the highest accuracy and precision results. The classifier results could be
further improved if the user profile attributes collected were complete, as several
user profile attributes were not available. Also, as previously mentioned, a future
enhancement will include the presentation of the recommended label to the focus
user for validation which would thus improve the overall accuracy. Our approach is
an improvement over the current state of the norm of users completely ignoring their
policy altogether or going through the hassle of labeling all users by hand.
Figures 9(c) and 9(d) depict the accuracy and precision of the fused classifiers
(group voting, group confidence product and most confident) and the best classifier
of the focus user (no fusion) holding all parameters constant (AD Tree classifier,
β = 10) except for the size of the training set (α). The training set was varied from
10%-40%. The fused classifiers, performed consistently better than the no fusion case
with the accuracy and precision improvements proportionally increasing with higher
training set sizes. The fused classifiers, for the most part, performed similarly. There
is an improvement going from 10% to 20%, i.e., if a user labels 20%, vice 10%, of his
friends as trusted or non-trusted, there is improvement in the accuracy of the classifier
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labeling the test set. Therefore, it is sufficient to ask the user to label between 10% to
20% of their friends in order for the policy manager to effectively label the remaining
users as trusted or non-trusted.
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Figure 10: PolicyMgr experimental results varying the selected β
To investigate the size of selected fusion classifiers (β), we conducted experiments
holding all parameters constant (AD Tree classifier, α = 20%) while varying β. Fig-
ures 10(a) and 10(b) depict the accuracy and precision of the fused classifiers and the
best classifier of the focus user (no fusion) for the different β values (10-40). Note
that as we increase β, the accuracy and precision drop. This is because as the size of
β increases, the fusion result is diluted with more users who have classifiers with low
confidence. Note that even though the accuracy and precision drop as β increases, the
fusion based classifier still consistently performs better than the no fusion classifier.
If most user mapping functions fΘk have low accuracy rates, a threshold for β can be
introduced.
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4.2 Assisted Friend Grouping
4.2.1 Preliminaries
Access control systems regulate the actions that subjects can take on objects.
Subjects (e.g., friends) are the actors that invoke an action or access mode (e.g.,
read) on a user’s object (e.g., privacy information like date of birth or content like
a picture). An authorization is a tuple < s, o, a >, where s is a subject, o is an
object and a is an access mode. Subjects and objects are dynamic. Friends come
and go. User content is added, updated and deleted on a regular basis. Users must
maintain up to date and accurate authorization lists. This can be a daunting task.
If there are m subjects, n objects and p access modes, then there are potentially
m × n × p authorizations. See Figure 11. For example, if a user has 130 friends, 90
pieces of content and one access mode (read), the number of potential authorizations
he must maintain is 11,700. Security administration, including granting / revoking
authorizations (permissions), is very challenging.
Subjects
.
.
.
Objects
.
.
.
Potential Authorizations = m x n x p
read
read O
1
S
1
O
n
S
m
Figure 11: Subjects / objects
Many current social networking platforms offer a simple policy management ap-
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proach. Security aware users are able to specify policies for their profile objects. For
example, my work colleague is restricted from seeing my photos. But, my trusted
best friend from school may access all my information. Facebook provides an op-
tional mechanism that allows users to create custom lists to organize friends and set
privacy restrictions. Similarly, Google+ allows users to create Circles of friends, such
as family, acquaintances, etc., where the user can apply policies based on these Cir-
cles. Facebook also has smart lists which automatically group friends who live near
by or attend the same school. However, managing access for hundreds of friends is
still a very difficult and burdensome task [38]. In addition, security unaware users
typically follow an open and permissive default policy. As a result, the potential for
unwanted information leakage is great [4]. We believe that current capabilities to
manage access to user profile information on today’s social networking platforms are
inadequate.
One approach that has been taken to alleviate the burden of managing large num-
bers of authorizations is the implementation of role based access control (RBAC)
[18, 58, 59]. Role based access control introduces a role which is a container that has
functional meaning, e.g., a specific job within an enterprise. Object permissions are
assigned to roles. Roles are then populated with subjects who are granted the object
permissions associated with the role(s) in which they belong. This level of abstraction
alleviates the burden of managing large numbers of subject to object permissions as-
signments. See Figure 12. For the purposes of discussion, we will use the term group
as to be synonymous with the term role, with the understanding that traditionally
roles have subject to object permissions assignments and groups traditionally only
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have subject assignments.
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Figure 12: Role based access control
RBAC focuses on abstracting the complexity of managing large numbers of sub-
jects for the purposes of security administration. Most attention, in access control
literature, has been placed on the subject side of the equation. More limited research
has focused on the object side of the equation, i.e., how to manage large sets of objects
for the purposes of controlling access. The basic premise of access control systems
is to protect and control access to sensitive resources / assets (i.e., objects). Just as
subjects are dynamic, so are objects. Objects are created. Their properties change,
e.g., sensitivity level, size, etc. They ultimately are retired or deleted. Managing the
full life-cycle of large numbers of objects can be complex and difficult.
Moyer and Abamad extend RBAC by introducing Generalized Role Based Access
Control [46]. GRBAC proposes environment and object roles. Environment roles
describe environmental conditions on which access control decisions can be made,
e.g., temporal, system load, etc. Object roles are similar to subject roles in that they
provide a level of abstraction for objects. Objects can be grouped based on some
common property, e.g., sensitivity level, creation date, size, etc. Thus, by grouping
subjects and objects, the number of authorizations can be greatly reduced. If there
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are j subject groups (j ≤ m), k object groups (k ≤ n) and p access modes, then there
are potentially j×k×p ≤ m×n×p authorizations. See Figure 13. For example, if a
user has 10 friend groups, 20 object groups and one access mode (read), the number
of authorizations he must maintain is 200. Security administration starts to become
more manageable with subject / object grouping access control models.
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Figure 13: Subject grouping / object grouping
4.2.2 Framework
Traditional RBAC can be leveraged within social networks. Often, people’s rela-
tionships drive privacy decisions. People like to specify groups for their friend relation-
ships, in which they then can set privacy policies [25, 51]. We refer to this approach
as group based policy management. However, populating relationship groups can be
very time consuming and burdensome to the user [26]. We introduce a group based
policy management model that assists users in placing their subjects (or friends) into
relationship groups. Our approach leverages proven clustering techniques to aid the
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user in grouping their friends more efficiently. In addition, we provide a mechanism to
set friend-level exceptions within group policies. Our model is referred to as Assisted
Friend Grouping – a Policy Management Assistance Tool.
Group based policy management allows users to populate groups based on rela-
tionship and assign object permissions to the groups, refer to Figure 12. Assisted
Friend Grouping extends this model in two areas: 1) provides the user with assis-
tance in grouping their friends, and 2) provides the user the ability to set friend-level
exceptions within the group policy. See Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Assisted friend grouping model
For the purposes of our prototype Facebook application, we predefined 10 rela-
tionship groups: Family, Close Friends, Graduate School, Under Graduate School,
High School, Work, Acquaintances, Friends of Friend, Community, and Other. These
groups were carefully selected, in part, from the work of Jones et al. [26]. They
postulate that users group their friends, for controlling privacy, based on six criteria:
Social Circles, Tie Strength, Temporal Episodes, Geographical Locations, Functional
Roles and Organizational Boundaries. Our friend relationship groups were selected
to reflect these criteria.
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Within our prototype, each friend is presented to the user in the center of a friend
grouping page, refer to Figure 15. The user is asked to select, for each friend, the
group that best represents their relationship. They can either “drag” the friend to
the appropriate relationship group on the page. Or, the user can click the representa-
tive relationship group name. To assist users in populating their relationship groups,
we leverage the Clasuet Newman Moore (CNM) network clustering algorithm [11].
This clustering algorithm analyzes and detects community structure in networks by
optimizing their modularity [49]. Modularity is a metric that describes the quality
of a specific proposed division of a network into communities. Our prototype clus-
ters the user’s social network graph creating CNM clusters (or groups) of friends.
During friend grouping, we present the friends to the user in CNM group order as
recommendations. For example, Bob has 50 friends and clustering his social network
graph using CNM produces five clusters. We present to Bob, as recommendations
for grouping, all the friends of one CNM group before presenting the friends of each
subsequent CNM group. The premise is that CNM groups roughly align with user
defined friend populated relationship groups.
By presenting friends in the order they potentially will be grouped, the friend
grouping time can be vastly reduced. The user’s mental model is focused on roughly
one relationship at a time, e.g., work colleagues. The user can quickly ascertain that
the stream of friends being presented are all work colleagues and can be placed in the
Work group. This approach reduces the number of “mental task switches” the user
must perform between multiple relationship groups. After all the friends are grouped,
the user sets the group policy by setting permissions that allow or deny access to the
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Figure 15: Assisted friend grouping user interface
user’s profile objects, e.g., email address, photos, etc. Finally, we provide the user
the ability to set friend-level exceptions for each group policy. For example, a group
policy may deny access to the user’s email address except for group member Alice.
Most social networking platforms also provide a policy exception setting capability.
4.2.3 User Study
In designing our user study 1, we set out to answer the following research questions:
Q1. Do proven clustering techniques align with user defined relationship groups?
Q2. Can proven clustering techniques assist users in grouping their friends more
efficiently?
Q3. What are users’ perceptions of assisted friend grouping techniques?
1Approved IRB Protocol #11-08-01
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4.2.3.1 Design
In order to answer these research questions, we built three tasks and one survey into
a prototype Facebook application. The three tasks and the survey were designed to
evaluate traditional group based policy management and our Assisted Friend Group-
ing Model. See Table 2.
Table 2: Assisted friend grouping user study tasks
Assisted Friend Grouping
(Facebook Application: Assisted Friend Grouping)
Task 1 Group friends
Task 2 Set group policy
Task 3 Review and possibly set friend-level
exceptions to group policy
Survey 1 Complete a brief survey for Tasks 1-3
In the first task (Task 1), the user is instructed to place 50 of their randomly
selected friends into the ten predefined groups. We divided the user participants into
two groups, namely Not Assisted and Assisted. For the Not Assisted population,
the 50 friends were presented to the user for grouping in random order. For the
Assisted population, the 50 friends were presented to the user for grouping in CNM
group order, as described in Section 4.2.2. Friends were presented to the user for
grouping based on clustering the user’s social graph using the CNM algorithm. We
measured the grouping time for both populations. After the user placed their friends
into groups, they were asked to select access permissions for each group (Task 2).
Allow/Deny permissions were selected for each profile object and/or profile object
category. Finally in Task 3, the user was asked to review and possibly select friend-
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level exceptions to the group policy that was set in Task 2.
Table 3: Sampling of survey questions
Ease of Use
Question 1 It was simple to use this system.
Question 2 Overall, I am satisfied with the ease of completing the tasks.
Question 3 It was easy to learn to use this system.
Readability
Question 4 I easily understood who had access to what in my profile.
Question 5 The information was effective in helping me complete the tasks
and scenarios.
Question 6 I could understand what my friends could access in my profile.
Flexibility
Question 7 The system had enough flexibility in allowing me to set what my
friends could access in my profile.
Question 8 This system has all the functions and capabilities I expect it to have.
Question 9 I could easily set what my friends could access in my profile.
Upon completion of Tasks 1, 2 and 3, the user was asked to complete a survey.
The user responded to questions designed to capture their perceptions of group based
policy management, both the Not Assisted and Assisted friend grouping approaches.
Table 3 provides a sampling of the questions, which were presented to the user in a
different order than they actually appear in the table. The question responses are
on a Likert-scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Each question is
designed to capture the user’s perceptions in the following areas:
Ease of Use: The user needs to be able to manage their policies in an easy, intuitive
and effective way such that they have a consistent experience. Complex and laborious
policy management mechanisms can lead to ineffective policies.
Readability: Not only does a policy management solution have to be easy to use,
it must be decipherable. The core component of any access control mechanism is the
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policy which governs the access. The policy not only must be available and visible
to the user, but it also must be readable. Policies that are complex and difficult to
understand are more likely to be misconfigured resulting in unintended consequences,
e.g., data leakage.
Flexibility: Policy management mechanisms must be flexible to accommodate the
user’s needs and intentions. Effective policy management must create a balance
between coarse grained and fine grained access control. Traditionally, coarse grained
access control provides few options to the end user. On the other hand, fine grained
access control, although extremely flexible in that it provides lots of options and
capabilities, is traditionally overwhelming and complex. A balance between too little
flexibility and an overly burdensome policy management mechanism is needed.
4.2.3.2 Participants
We recruited our user study participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon
Mechanical Turk is a crowd sourcing marketplace that pairs Requesters of work and
Workers. Requesters formulate work into Human Intelligent Tasks (HIT) which are
individual tasks that workers complete. We set up our prototype Facebook application
as a HIT, which included the three tasks and the survey. To better control the quality
of the recruited participants, we mandated that each worker have a minimum of 100
friends and a 95% HIT approval rating, or better. The HIT took approximately 10-15
minutes to complete, for which each worker was paid a fee of $1.00.
Our user study consisted of 145 participants. See Table 4. The male / female
ratio was approximately 6:4. Most of our user participants were young, fairly well
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educated and active Facebook users. Approximately 54% were between the ages of
18 to 25. Almost 69% had between two and four years of college. 74% used Facebook
daily. In addition, as part of the demographics portion of our survey, we collected
Westin privacy sentiment information with definitions of Unconcerned, Pragmatist
and Fundamentalist provided by [35]:
Table 4: Assisted friend grouping user study participants
n=145 % of n
Age
18 to 25 79 54.5%
26 to 39 59 40.7%
40 and above 7 4.8%
Gender
male 85 58.6%
female 60 41.4%
Education Level
≤ high school 11 7.6%
2 years of college 34 23.4%
4 years of college 66 45.5%
> 4 years of college 34 23.4%
Facebook Experience
< 1 year 12 8.3%
1 to 2 years 32 22.1%
2 to 3 years 44 30.3%
3 to 4 years 36 24.8%
> 4 years 21 14.5%
Facebook Use
Daily 108 74.5%
2 to 3 times per week 28 19.3%
Weekly 9 6.2%
Westin Data
Unconcerned Users 9 6.2%
Pragmatists 106 73.1%
Fundametalists 30 20.7%
Unconcerned Users: This group does not know what the “privacy fuss” is all about,
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supports the benefits of most organizational programs over warnings about privacy
abuse, has little problem with supplying their personal information to government au-
thorities or businesses, and sees no need for creating another government bureaucracy
(a Federal Big Brother) to protect someone’s privacy.
Pragmatists: This group weighs the value to them and society of various business
or government programs calling for personal information, examines the relevance and
social propriety of the information sought, wants to know the potential risks to privacy
or security of their information, looks to see whether fair information practices are
being widely enough observed, and then decides whether they will agree or disagree
with specific information activities - with their trust in the particular industry or
company involved being a critical decisional factor.
Fundamentalists: This group sees privacy as an especially high value, rejects the
claims of many organizations to need or be entitled to get personal information for
their business or governmental programs, thinks more individuals should simply refuse
to give out information they are asked for, and favors enactment of strong federal and
state laws to secure privacy rights and control organizational discretion.
4.2.3.3 Prototype Architecture
We implemented a prototype Facebook application called Assisted Friend Group-
ing. The application is hosted on our server. The back-end is based on PHP and
MySQL. The client-side was implemented using Adobe Flex as a flash application.
Upon installing the application, REST like Facebook API’s and Facebook Query Lan-
guage are used to retrieve the user’s profile and social connections. The collected data
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is transmitted over secure HTTPS based API’s to our server and stored in a MySQL
database. The application built the participant’s social graph, which is clustered us-
ing the CNM implementation provided by the Flare Toolkit Library. The application
implements several additional functionalities including: user grouping, group policy
specification and survey tools.
4.2.3.4 Results
In evaluating our Assisted Friend Grouping Model, we set out to show that CNM
will aid in grouping users’ friends more efficiently for group based policy management
approaches. Our hypothesis is that CNM clusters roughly align with user defined
friend relationship groups. In the example illustrated in Figure 16, CNM partitions
the user’s social graph into distinct clusters, as depicted by the large circles. The
user also categorizes their friends into user defined relationship groups, i.e., Family,
Graduate School, etc. Figure 16 illustrates that there is overlap and agreement be-
tween the CNM clusters and the user defined relationship groups. We leverage this
alignment by presenting friends to the user for grouping based on cluster/relationship
order. By presenting friends in this manner, the user’s mental model is focused on
one relationship at a time. This approach results in fewer “mental task switches”
between multiple relationship groups and thus improved friend grouping times.
We used the Adjusted Rand Index to measure the agreement between CNM clusters
and user defined relationship groups [22]. The Adjusted Rand Index compares the
predicated labels (CNM clusters) with the actual labels (user defined relationship
groups) and produces an index between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates no overlap and
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Figure 16: Example cluster/group alignment
1 is complete agreement or overlap. The Adjusted Rand Index, in general form,
can be described as Index−ExpectedIndex
MaxIndex−ExpectedIndex . We clustered users’ social graphs who
were Not Assisted in grouping their friends, i.e., we presented their friend set for
grouping in random order. We compared the clusters generated by CNM and the
populated groups defined by the user. We found, that on average, users populated
6.3 relationship groups. Overall, our results showed an average Adjusted Rand Index
of 0.627. This demonstrates that there is overlap and a level of alignment between
CNM clusters and user defined relationship groups. In looking just at Fundamentalist
Users, we saw a higher level of alignment (Adjusted Rand Index = 0.677).
We also wanted to determine if presenting friends in CNM group order would
influence the user in how they grouped their friends. We compared the Assisted friend
grouping population with those that were Not Assisted. Using a Welch Two-Sample
T-Test, we found no statistical significance between the two populations (p = 0.118).
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Refer to the Adjusted Rand Index section of Table 5 and Figure 17(a), where error
bars show one standard deviation above and below the mean. Our Assisted Friend
Grouping Model does not bias the user, i.e., the user would produce the same groups
and populate those groups with the same friends either using our Assisted Friend
Grouping approach or not.
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Figure 17: Assisted friend grouping user study results
Next, we set out to measure the time it took a user to populate their relationship
groups. We measured the time it took a user to group 50 of their friends presented
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Table 5: Assisted friend grouping user study results
Measure Not Assisted Assisted p-value
(µ, σ) (µ, σ)
Adjusted Rand Index
Unconcerned (0.521, 0.05) (0.573, 0.03) 0.218
Pragmatist (0.625, 0.06) (0.637, 0.06) 0.431
Fundamentalist (0.677, 0.08) (0.713, 0.08) 0.320
All (0.627, 0.07) (0.650, 0.07) 0.118
Grouping Time (seconds)
Unconcerned (175.2, 106.2) (108.8, 29.0) 0.306
Pragmatist (220.7, 45.9) (178.9, 43.4) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (294.5, 45.2) (202.0, 52.3) < 0.001
All (231.0, 60.1) (180.2, 48.4) < 0.001
User Perceptions (7 point Likert-scale)
Ease of Use (4.63, 0.85) (5.33, 1.11) < 0.001
Readability (4.31, 0.72) (5.32, 1.06) < 0.001
Flexibility (4.38, 0.66) (5.33, 0.99) < 0.001
in random order (Not Assisted). We compared that with the time it took a user to
group 50 of their friends presented in CNM group order (Assisted), as described in
Section 4.2.3.1. For Unconcerned Users, there was no statistical significance between
Not Assisted and Assisted (p = 0.306). However, we did see statistical significance
between the other categories of users: Pragmatists, Fundamentalists and the popu-
lation as a whole – all p-values were less than 0.001. Overall, using CNM, we saw a
22% reduction in time that it took a user to group 50 of their friends, 180.2 seconds
(Assisted) versus 231 seconds (Not Assisted). Refer to the Grouping Time section
of Table 5 and Figure 17(b). One factor for this reduction in time is that the user’s
mental model is focused on one relationship group at a time, which enables the user
to quickly group most family members, for example, before grouping the next set
of friends. Fewer “mental task switches” between relationship groups are required
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thus reducing the overall friend grouping time. It is also interesting to note, although
not entirely surprising, that Fundamentalists took longer, on average, to group their
friends than Pragmatists and Unconcerned Users. One possible reason that Funda-
mentalists took more time may be because they apply more scrutiny as they group
their friends.
We also measured users’ perceptions of the Not Assisted and Assisted friend group-
ing approaches, as described in Section 4.2.3.1. A T-Test was used to compared the
Not Assisted and Assisted populations. We found statistical significance in all user
perception areas: Ease of Use, Readability and Flexibility – all p-values were less than
0.001. Users found friend grouping easier to use when their friends were presented in
CNM order. For Ease of Use, Not Assisted averaged 4.63 and Assisted averaged 5.33
on a 7 point Likert-scale. Readability and Flexibility also had similar results. Refer
to the User Perceptions section of Table 5 and Figure 17(c). Overall, users had more
positive perceptions of grouping their friends leveraging CNM than not having the
assistance of CNM.
4.2.3.5 Discussion
Complex and laborious policy management mechanisms can lead to ineffective poli-
cies and compromises of information. Group based policy management is an improve-
ment which provides a level of abstraction to the user (i.e., group) that allows them
to manage permissions of large friend sets easier. However, this approach has some
limitations, one being the ability to set fine grained access control policies. Intro-
ducing the capability to set friend-level exceptions to group policies overcomes this
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limitation. By doing so, users have the ability to set more expressive access control
policies. Another shortcoming of group based policy management approaches is the
burden associated with populating relationship groups for large friends sets. Our As-
sisted friend grouping model alleviates this burden by reducing the amount of time it
takes to populate friend groups. User perceptions of our approach are encouraging.
Providing tools in the hands of the user, which assist them in managing access to
their profile objects, translates into more effective privacy management.
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4.3 Same-As Subject Management
4.3.1 Framework
A shortcoming of the group based policy management approach is that the user’s
attention (mental model) is focused in multiple areas. For example, a user must first
focus on the friend’s relationship in order to group them appropriately. Next, the user
must change focus to the group in order to set the group-level policy. Finally, the
user must switch focus back to the friend in order to set any friend-level exceptions
for each group policy. We introduce an approach that overcomes this weakness.
Our model leverages users’ memory and opinion of their friends to set policies for
other similar friends. Studies have shown that users perform more efficiently using
recognition based approaches that have minimal task interruptions [12, 23]. Using our
visual policy editor, a user selects a representative friend (Same-As Example Friend),
assigns appropriate object permissions to this friend and then associates other similar
friends to the same policy. Our model is called Same-As Subject Management – a
Policy Management Assistance Tool. Figure 18 illustrates our model; the Same-As
Example Friend is depicted in front of the user’s other similar friends who have been
assigned the same set of object permissions.
First, the user selects a friend (Same-As Example Friend) that is representative of
a subset of their friend set. The notion is that we all have subsets of friends that have
similar levels of trust. The user selects one easy to remember friend from each subset
as its respective representative.
Second, using our visual policy editor, the user assigns the appropriate object level
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Figure 18: Same-As subject management model
permissions for each object within their profile to this Same-As Example Friend. For
the purposes of our prototype Facebook application, we presented three profile object
categories: Albums, About Me and Education and Work. Within each profile object
category, objects of the same family are presented. For example, About Me includes
Birthday, Status, Current City, email, etc., as indicated by our visual policy editor
in Figure 19. The user can allow or deny access to any object or object category
by simply clicking on the object or object category. For example, if the user doesn’t
want the Same-As Example Friend to have access to a specific photo album, they
merely click on that album and the object permission is set to deny. The selected
photo album will be grayed out. Or, for example, if the user doesn’t want to allow
access to any of their education and work information, they click on Deny for the
object category Education and Work and the entire object category will be grayed
out, thus effectively setting the permissions to deny for each profile object within that
category. Any permutation of permissions is allowed.
Third, after the permissions are set for the Same-As Example Friend, other like
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Figure 19: Same-As subject management user interface
or similar friends (Same-As Friends) are assigned to the policy. The visual policy
editor presents to the user their friend set, where the user can associate a friend to
an already defined Same-As Example Friend. Or, the user can designate a friend as a
new Same-As Example Friend, thereby setting a new policy which would be assigned
to other similar friends. This process repeats itself for the user’s entire friend set.
4.3.2 User Study
In designing our user study, we set out to answer the following research questions:
Q4. Will a policy management approach based on leveraging a user’s memory and
perception of their friends outperform traditional group based policy manage-
ment approaches?
Q5. Do different policy management approaches impact the conservativeness of a
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user’s policy?
Q6. Will users’ perceptions of a policy management approach based on leveraging a
user’s memory and perception of their friends be higher than traditional group
based policy management approaches?
4.3.2.1 Design
In order to answer these research questions, we built one task and one survey into
a prototype Facebook application. The task and survey were designed to evaluate
our Same-As Subject Management Model. See Table 6.
Table 6: Same-As subject management user study tasks
Same-As Subject Management
(Facebook Application: Same-As Subject)
Task 4 Set permissions for friends using another
friend’s permissions as the model/example
Survey 2 Complete a brief survey for Task 4
The second prototype Facebook application (of which was of a similar architecture
as described in Section 4.2.3.3) includes the fourth task and second survey. This task
was designed to evaluate our Same-As Subject Management Model, as described in
Section 4.3.1. The user was instructed, for a subset of their friends (50 randomly
chosen ones), to select a Same-As Example Friend. After the user seleced their Same-
As Example Friend, they then set appropriate profile object permissions for this
example friend and assigned the policy to appropriate like or similar friends. This
step was repeated as necessary, i.e., for as many unique policies the user would like
to assign for their friend set. We measured the total time to complete Task 4. After
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completing Task 4, the user completed a second survey similar to the survey presented
in Section 4.2.3.1.
4.3.2.2 Participants
Similarly, as described in Section 4.2.3.2, our user study participants were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We set up our prototype Facebook application as a
HIT, which included both the task and the survey, as described in Section 4.3.2.1.
Table 7: Same-As subject management user study participants
n=153 % of n
Age
18 to 25 92 60.1%
26 to 39 53 34.6%
40 and above 8 5.2%
Gender
male 99 64.7%
female 54 35.3%
Education Level
≤ high school 10 6.5%
2 years of college 58 37.9%
4 years of college 52 34.0%
> 4 years of college 33 21.6%
Facebook Experience
< 1 year 7 4.6%
1 to 2 years 33 21.6%
2 to 3 years 36 23.5%
3 to 4 years 46 30.1%
> 4 years 31 20.3%
Facebook Use
Daily 118 77.1%
2 to 3 times per week 31 20.3%
Weekly 4 2.6%
Westin Data
Unconcerned Users 10 6.5%
Pragmatists 98 64.1%
Fundametalists 45 29.4%
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Our user study consisted of 153 participants. See Table 7. The male / female ratio
was approximately 6:4. Similarly as our previous user study, most of our user par-
ticipants were young, fairly well educated and active Facebook users. Approximately
60% were between the ages of 18 to 25. Almost 72% had between two and four years
of college. 77% used Facebook daily. In addition, as part of the demographics portion
of our survey, we collected Westin privacy sentiment information with definitions of
Unconcerned, Pragmatist and Fundamentalist provided by [35].
4.3.2.3 Results
We compared the policy authoring times between Group Based Policy Management
(hereafter referred to as Group Based) and Same-As Subject Management (hereafter
referred to Same-As Subject). Our results are summarized in the Policy Authoring
Time section of Table 8 and illustrated in Figure 20(a). In analyzing these results, we
found that there is statistical significance across all user categories, i.e., Unconcerned
Users (p = 0.001), Pragmatists (p < 0.001) and Fundamentalists (p < 0.001). Overall,
Same-As Subject outperformed Group Based in policy authoring time. Across the
board, we observed more than a two-fold decrease in the amount of time it took
a user to author their policy. One factor attributing to this reduction is the steps
involved in authoring a policy. Group Based approaches have three distinct steps: 1)
group friends, 2) set group policy and 3) assign friend-level exceptions to the group
policy. Using this approach, the user first focuses on the friend’s relationship in order
to group them appropriately. Next, the user switches their attention to the group in
order to set the group policy. Finally, the user switches their attention back to the
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friend in order to set any friend-level exceptions to the group policy. Whereas, using
our Same-As Subject approach and visual policy editor, the user simply leverages
their memory and opinion of a friend to set policies for other similar friends. As a
result, users can author policies in less time and thus ease the burden associated with
managing their online privacy settings.
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Figure 20: Same-As subject management user study results
Table 8: Same-As subject management user study results
Measure Group Based Same-As Subject p-value
(µ, σ) (µ, σ)
Policy Authoring Time (seconds)
Unconcerned (411.0, 97.3) (232.3, 76.1) 0.001
Pragmatist (450.3, 119.9) (185.8, 66.6) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (539.4, 129.1) (208.9, 116.8) < 0.001
All (465.9, 125.6) (195.6, 85.6) < 0.001
Policy Openness (see Definition 4)
Unconcerned (0.932, 0.141) (0.911, 0.148) 0.769
Pragmatist (0.834, 0.118) (0.768, 0.108) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (0.732, 0.112) (0.664, 0.084) 0.018
All (0.819, 0.127) (0.747, 0.122) < 0.001
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Not only are users able to set their policies more rapidly using Same-As Subject,
they are also setting more conservative policies, policies that are less permissive. We
examined the openness of each user’s policy, where Policy Openness is defined as:
Definition 4 (Policy Openness) The probability of a user permitting a friend access
to a specific profile object. O(u, o) = |Allow(f,o)||Fu| , where Allow(f, o) ⊆ Fu is the set of
friends of user u who are allowed access to profile object o and Fu is the friend set of
u.
We measured Policy Openness relative to a user’s profile object ( i.e., email address)
and found, for Unconcerned Users, no statistical significance between Group Based
and Same-As Subject (p = 0.769). Unconcerned Users have “little problem with
supplying their personal information” to others in either approach. However, we do
see statistical significance between Group Based and Same-As Subject for Pragmatists
(p < 0.001), Fundamentalists (p = 0.018) and for the population as a whole (p <
0.001). Our findings are summarized in the Policy Openness section of Table 8 and
Figure 20(b). Using Group Based, users associate the policy with a group. Whereas,
using Same-As Subject, users associate the policy with a friend and in doing so have
the friend in the forefront of their mind. This allows users to be more selective and
careful in assigning permissions. Users are thinking of people, not groups. In addition,
as would be expected, our results show that Fundamentalists write more conservative
policies than Pragmatists and Unconcerned Users.
Overall, users found Same-As Subject easier to use than Group Based, 6.03 versus
4.98 on a 7 point Likert-scale, where 7 is Strongly Agree. We found statistical sig-
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Figure 21: Same-As subject management user study results – perceptions
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nificance in our comparison (p < 0.001). Refer to Figure 21(a) and the Ease of Use
section of Table 9. Using Same-As Subject over Group Based, we observed statistical
significance and improved Ease of Use ratings for all user categories: Unconcerned
Users, Pragmatists and Fundamentalists. We attribute the improved ratings to rea-
sons similar to what was discussed with regard to the reduction in policy authoring
time: reduced number of steps for authoring policies, our visual policy editor and
consistent focus with limited memory interruption. It is interesting to note that
Unconcerned Users averaged Ease of Use ratings higher than Pragmatists and Fun-
damentalists. Unconcerned Users don’t necessarily care much about privacy and
appreciate mechanisms that are easier. Fundamentalists find privacy to be “hard”
regardless of approach and Pragmatists fall somewhere in the middle.
Table 9: Same-As subject management user study results – perceptions
Measure Group Based Same-As Subject p-value
(µ, σ) (µ, σ)
Ease of Use (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned (5.20, 0.92) (6.11, 0.59) 0.046
Pragmatist (4.98, 1.03) (6.06, 0.59) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (4.90, 1.15) (5.94, 0.64) < 0.001
All (4.98, 1.04) (6.03, 0.61) < 0.001
Readability (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned (4.97, 1.14) (6.06, 0.60) 0.049
Pragmatist (4.85, 0.94) (6.04, 0.56) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (4.82, 1.02) (5.89, 0.65) < 0.001
All (4.85, 0.96) (6.00, 0.59) < 0.001
Flexibility (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned (5.05, 1.06) (5.90, 0.72) 0.095
Pragmatist (4.78, 1.02) (6.00, 0.59) < 0.001
Fundamentalist (4.86, 1.12) (5.75, 0.71) 0.002
All (4.82, 1.03) (5.92, 0.64) < 0.001
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Users found Same-As Subject to be substantially more readable than Group Based.
There is statistical significance across all user categories. Refer to Figure 21(b) and
the Readability section of Table 9. We attribute these high ratings to the simplicity
of the Same-As Subject approach. Users could easily understand who had access to
what profile object. Users found the organization of the information on the screen to
be decipherable and ease to read. Using Same-As Subject and leveraging our visual
policy editor, a user need only to recall their opinions of their friends in order to set
access control policies. This was accomplished all on one screen. Whereas, the Group
Based approach was more complex with multiple steps and screens.
In evaluating Flexibility, on average, users gave higher ratings to Same-As Subject
over Group Based, 5.92 versus 4.82. We found statistical significance for Pragmatists,
Fundamentalists and the population as a whole. However, we didn’t find significance
between the two approaches for Unconcerned Users. Refer to Figure 21(c) and the
Flexibility section of Table 9. In access control terms, both Group Based and Same-
As Subject have similar expressive power. That is, users can compose policies of the
same granularity with either Group Based or Same-As Subject. Group Based allows
finer grained policies with the inclusion of friend-level exceptions to group policies.
Same-As Subject inherently has this capability and was perceived to be more flexible.
4.3.2.4 Discussion
Same-As Subject Management further improves upon group based policy manage-
ment. It provides a similar level of expressive power for setting fine grained policies.
But, doing it in a way that is easier for the user to manage and intuitively easier
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to comprehend. Using our visual policy editor, users can compose readable policies
that are not complex and difficult to understand. In addition, users can compose
these policies in less than half the time it takes traditional group based policy man-
agement approaches. Policy management becomes less of a laborious and tedious
task and results in more properly configured and maintained policies, which leads to
improved privacy. In addition, users are authoring more conservative policies, which
ultimately provide better levels of protection. Same-As Subject Management keeps
users more informed, improves the adoption and accuracy of access control policies
and, ultimately, improves user security.
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4.4 Example Friend Selection
4.4.1 Framework
Same-As Subject Management is an improvement over Group Based Policy Man-
agement. To further improve Same-As Subject Management, we propose two ap-
proaches for recommending Same-As Example Friends to the user, which we call
Example Friend Selection – a Policy Management Assistance Tool. Both approaches,
called CNM Order and Sample CNM, leverage the Clasuet Newman Moore (CNM)
network clustering algorithm for clustering the user’s social network graph.
In CNM Order, we present the user’s friends in CNM cluster order, i.e., all the
friends in Cluster #1 are presented to the user followed by all the friends in Cluster#2,
etc. The first friend presented for each cluster is the friend with the highest degree
in that cluster. The premise is the highly connected friends are potentially more
well known and thus easier to remember making them good candidates for Same-As
Example Friends. For example, Figure 22 illustrates a user’s social network graph
that has three CNM clusters of friends. Friend A has the highest degree in Cluster
#1 and, therefore, Friend A is presented to the user first as a recommendation for
a Same-As Example Friend. After Friend A is presented to the user, the remaining
friends of Cluster #1 are presented for association with an already defined Same-As
Example Friend or for assignment as a new Same-As Example Friend. After all of
Cluster #1 friends are presented, Cluster #2 friends are presented in a similar fashion,
i.e., Friend L has the highest degree in Cluster #2 and thus is presented to the user
as a possible candidate for a Same-As Example Friend followed by the remainder of
63
the friends in Cluster #2. This same process is repeated for all clusters.
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Figure 22: CNM order model
The premise is by presenting the friends in CNM cluster order, the user can set the
policy for the Same-As Example Friend and then associate all other similar friends
with this Same-As Example Friend. The user’s mental model is focused on one Same-
As Example Friend at a time. After the policy is set for the Same-As Example Friend,
the user can quickly ascertain that the stream of friends that follow may potentially be
associated with this Same-As Example Friend. By presenting friends is this manner,
policy authoring time can potentially be reduced.
In our second approach for assisting users in selecting their Same-As Example
Friend, called Sample CNM Order, we present all of the friends with the highest degree
within their cluster first. These friends are highly connected and are potentially more
well known and thus easier to remember making them good candidates for Same-As
Example Friends. Using the example social network graph depicted in Figure 23,
Sample CNM Order will present Friends A, L and W first followed by the remainder
of the friends from Cluster #1, followed by the reminder of the friends from Cluster
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#2 and then the remainder of the friends from Cluster #3. In Sample CNM Order,
users enable their policies globally followed by policy assignment for each of their
friends. The premise of this approach is that the user will set all their policies for all
their Same-As Example Friends first and then quickly associate the stream of friends
that follow with their respective Same-As Example Friend, thus potentially reducing
policing authoring time.
Cluster #1 Cluster #2
Recommended Same-As 
Example Friend
Cluster #3
Order friends are presented
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Figure 23: Sample CNM order model
4.4.2 User Study
In designing our user study, we set out to answer the following research question:
Q7. Can different friend selection techniques effectively aid users in picking example
friends that are used in developing policy templates?
4.4.2.1 Design
We leveraged the same user study design and prototype Facebook application as
described in Section 4.3.2.1, with one addition. The visual policy editor was modified
to use three approaches for assisting users in selecting their Same-As Example Friend:
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Random, CNM Order and Sample CNM Order. Random presents friends to the user
in random order.
We also leveraged the same user participants as described in Section 4.3.2.2. They
were divided into three groups, namely Random, CNM Order and Sample CNM
Order. For the Random population, the 50 friends were presented to the user in
random order. For the CNM Order and Sample CNM Order populations, the 50
friends were presented to the user in CNM Order and Sample CNM Order respectively,
as described in Section 4.4.1.
4.4.2.2 Results
We evaluated the three approaches used by Same-As Subject Management for as-
sisting users in selecting their Same-As Example Friend. Using analysis of variance
(ANOVA), we measured the effects of the three approaches. Our results are summa-
rized in Table 10.
Table 10: Random vs. CNM order vs. sample CNM order
Measure Random CNM Sample
(control) Order CNM F − Statistic
µ µ µ p− value
Policy Authoring Time (seconds)
250.0 192.3 149.2 F(2,150)=21.65
p < 0.001
User Perceptions (7 point Likert-scale)
Ease of Use 5.67 6.04 6.35 F(2,150)=18.68
p < 0.001
Readability 5.66 5.97 6.34 F(2,150)=19.67
p < 0.001
Flexibility 5.58 5.90 6.26 F(2,150)=16.52
p < 0.001
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In evaluating authoring time, we observed a 23% reduction in the time it took a
user to author a policy leveraging CNM Order (192.3 seconds) versus Random (250
seconds). Figure 24 displays the policy authoring time results in the form of box plots,
where the top and bottom of the boxes are the first and third quartiles respectively
and the band near the middle of the box is the median. We see statistical significance
amongst the three groups (p < 0.001) with the F-Statistic (21.65) greater than 3.06
for a probability of 95%. We also ran a pairwise comparison leveraging the Bonferroni
correction where we observed statistical significance across all pairings.
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Figure 24: Policy authoring time
CNM Order allows users to author policies faster because we recommend highly
connected friends as Same-As Example Friends. The most highly connected friend of
a cluster is presented first and is more likely to be selected as a Same-As Example
Friend. This highly connected friend is potentially more well known and thus easier
to remember making them good candidates for Same-As Example Friends. After the
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policy is set, the stream of friends presented next are of the same cluster and po-
tentially the same relationship group and policy template. The user’s mental model
is focused on one Same-As Example Friend where they can quickly associate, if ap-
propriate, the stream of friends that follow with this Same-As Example Friend. This
process repeats itself for each of the user’s clusters.
Sample CNM Order (149.2 seconds) outperformed CNM Order with a 22% reduc-
tion in policy authoring time. In addition, Sample CNM Order outperformed Random
with a 40% reduction in policy authoring time. With Sample CNM Order, all the
user’s clusters’ most highly connected friends are presented first for policy author-
ing and then the remaining members of each cluster are presented in cluster order
for association with the appropriate Same-As Example Friend. With this example
friend selection technique, the user sets all their policy templates (Same-As Exam-
ple Friends) first and then associates appropriate friends with each policy template.
Users were able to author policies much faster leveraging this technique over Random
and CNM Order.
In measuring user perceptions of the three approaches for selecting the Same-As
Example Friend, we observed that Sample CNM Order was more positively perceived
than Random and CNM Order. Sample CNM Order was found to be easier to use
(6.35 on a 7 point Likert-scale ), more readable (6.34) and more flexible (6.26). See
Figure 25. We found statistical significance (p < 0.001) across the three areas mea-
sured (Ease of Use, Readability, Flexibility) with all F-Statistics greater than 3.06
for a probably of 95%. We also ran a pairwise comparison leveraging the Bonferroni
correction where we observed statistical significance across all pairings. Sample CNM
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Figure 25: Random vs. CNM order vs. sample CNM order
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Order, where the user authors all the policies for their Same-As Example Friends first,
outperformed both Random and CNM Order for both policy authoring time and user
perceptions.
4.4.2.3 Discussion
In evaluating different friend selection techniques for aiding users in picking example
friends (Same-As Example Friends), we found that both techniques introduced (CNM
Order and Sample CNM Order) outperformed the Random approach. Each new
technique reduced the time it took to author a policy. In addition, users’ perceptions
were higher over the Random approach. Presenting friends in CNM cluster order
using either technique (CNM Order or Sample CNM Order) potentially cuts down
on the amount of ”searching” a user must do to find the ”right” Same-As Example
Friend. We present the friends in an order that is potentially meaningful to the user.
As such, we would expect to have faster policy authoring times and improved user
perceptions.
In evaluating Sample CNM Order versus CNM Order, we see the former outper-
forming the latter in both policy authoring time and user perceptions. Sample CNM
Order allows a user to build their global policy set upfront. After which, they can
quickly assign appropriate friends to each policy. In leveraging this approach, users
were able to author policies more quickly than the other two approaches. In addition,
users had higher perceptions of Sample CNM Order.
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4.5 Same-As Object Management
4.5.1 Framework
Same-As Object Management leverages the same basic principles as Same-As Sub-
ject Management but in reverse. With Same-As Object Management (a Policy Man-
agement Assistance Tool), the user first groups their subjects. After which, the user is
asked to select a representative object (Same-As Example Object), set subject group
permissions for this Same-As Example Object and assign other similar objects the
same set of subject group permissions. This process is repeated for each of the user’s
representative objects (Same-As Example Objects). Figure 26 illustrates our model;
the Same-As Example Object is depicted in front of the user’s other similar objects
who have been assigned the same set of subject group permissions.
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Figure 26: Same-As object management model
For the purposes of our prototype Facebook application, the user is asked to group
approximately 30 of their randomly selected friends into ten predefined friend groups:
Family, Close Friends, Graduate School, Under Graduate School, High School, Work,
Acquaintances, Friends of Friend, Community, and Other. These groups were care-
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fully selected, in part, from the work of Jones et al. [26]. They postulate that users
group their friends, for controlling access to privacy information and content, based
on six criteria: Social Circles, Tie Strength, Temporal Episodes, Geographical Lo-
cations, Functional Roles and Organizational Boundaries. Our friend groups were
selected to reflect these criteria.
Figure 27: Same-As object management user interface
Using our visual policy editor, the user selects a picture (Same-As Example Picture)
that is representative of a subset of their picture set. See larger blue circle labeled “W”
in Figure 27. This Same-As Example Picture represents some subjective meaning of
sensitivity to the user, of which other pictures of a similar sensitivity level can be
associated. For example, Bob may select a picture that depicts him drinking alcohol
as the Same-As Example Picture that he uses to associate other similar pictures
of him drinking alcohol. Bob considers pictures of him drinking alcohol to be of a
certain sensitivity level and wants to limit who can view these pictures. The Same-As
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Example Picture should be easy to remember and is the representative for other like
or similar pictures.
Next, the user assigns the appropriate friend group permissions for this Same-As
Example Picture. The user can allow or deny access to any friend group by simply
clicking on the group to toggle between allow and deny permissions. If the user doesn’t
want a specific friend group to have access to the Same-As Example Picture, they
merely click on that friend group and the group will be grayed out. This indicates
that access is not allowed. For example, Bob may allow his Family group to view
pictures of him drinking alcohol, but deny viewing rights for his Work group. The
default permissions are set to deny access.
After the permissions are set for the Same-As Example Picture, other like or similar
pictures (Same-As Pictures) are assigned to the policy. The visual policy editor
presents to the user their picture set, where the user can associate a picture to an
already defined Same-As Example Picture. Or, the user can designate a picture as a
new Same-As Example Picture, thereby setting a new policy, which would be assigned
to other similar pictures. This process repeats itself for the user’s entire picture set.
For example in Figure 27, our visual policy editor depicts Same-As Example Picture
“Z” as having access to the Family and High School friend groups. (The remaining
friend groups are grayed out and, therefore, access is denied). All the Same-As
Pictures circled in red inherit these same permissions.
4.5.2 User Study
In designing our user study, we set out to answer the following research questions:
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Q8. Does Same-As Object Management allow for more expressive policies?
Q9. Does Same-As Object Management outperform other policy management ap-
proaches?
Q10. Does Same-As Object Management lead to more conservative policies?
Q11. What are user’s perceptions of Same-As Object Management compared to other
policy management approaches?
4.5.2.1 Design
In order to answer these research questions, we designed a within subjects user
study consisting of three experiments. To avoid ordering bias, the experiments were
presented in random order to the study participants. These three experiments were
implemented as part of our prototype Facebook application.
Experiment 1: The first experiment was designed to evaluate traditional subject
/ object grouping access control models (refer back to Figure 13). This experiment
has three tasks, as indicated in Table 11. First, the user was instructed to group
approximately 30 of their randomly selected friends into ten predefined friend groups.
After which, the user was asked to group approximately 15 of their randomly selected
pictures in up to four predefined and four user defined (optional) sensitivity groups.
Finally, the user was asked to select allow / deny access permissions specifying which
subject groups have access rights to each object group. We measured how many
unique policy templates the user created, how long the user took to author all their
policies (to include grouping activities) and the conservativeness of their policy set.
74
Upon completion of the three tasks for Experiment 1, the user completed a brief survey
designed to capture their perceptions of subject / object grouping access control
models.
Table 11: Same-As object management user study experiments
Experiment 1 – Subject / Object Grouping
Task 1 Group subjects
Task 2 Group objects
Task 3 Set permissions
Survey 1 Complete a brief survey for Tasks 1-3
Experiment 2 – Same-As Subject Management w/ Object Grouping
Task 4 Group objects
Task 5 Set permissions for subjects using another
subject’s permissions as the model / example
Survey 2 Complete a brief survey for Tasks 4-5
Experiment 3 – Same-As Object Management
Task 6 Group subjects
Task 7 Set permissions for objects using another
object’s permissions as the model / example
Survey 3 Complete a brief survey for Tasks 6-7
Experiment 2: The second experiment was designed to evaluate Same-As Subject
Management with Object Grouping. Same-As Subject Management, as described in
Section 4.3.1, is extended to allow for object grouping. Most online social networks
provide some means for grouping subjects, e.g., Facebook Friend Lists and Google+
Circles. However, most do not provide a means for grouping objects. With Same-As
Subject Management with Object Grouping, objects can be grouped by their specific
properties, e.g., size, creation date, type, event, location, sensitivity level, etc. Once
the objects are grouped, the user is asked to select a representative subject (Same-As
Example Subject), set object group permissions for this Same-As Example Subject
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and assign other similar subjects the same set of object group permissions. This
process is repeated for each of the user’s representative subjects (Same-As Example
Subjects). Figure 28 illustrates our model; the Same-As Example Subject is depicted
in front of the user’s other similar subjects who have been assigned the same set of
object group permissions.
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Figure 28: Same-As subject management model w/ object grouping
For the purposes of our prototype Facebook application, the user is asked to group
approximately 15 of their randomly selected pictures into four predefined and up to
four more user defined object sensitivity groups. The predefined groups are labeled
Public (Viewable by everyone), Private (Viewable by most, but not all), Sensitive
(Viewable by select friends) and Highly Sensitive (Viewable by a very select small set
of friends). These labels were designed in part from the classification schemes used
by many governmental organizations (e.g., Unclassified, Confidential, Secret and Top
Secret) and those used in the commercial sector, e.g., as described in RFC 3114.
Using our visual policy editor, the user selects a friend (Same-As Example Friend)
that is representative of a subset of their friend set. See larger red circle labeled
“A” in Figure 29. The notion is that we all have subsets of friends that have similar
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levels of trust. The user selects one easy to remember friend from each subset as its
respective representative.
Next, the user assigns the appropriate sensitivity group permissions for this Same-
As Example Friend. The user can allow or deny access to any sensitivity group by
simply clicking on the group to toggle between allow and deny permissions. For
example, if the user doesn’t want the Same-As Example Friend to have access to a
specific sensitivity group, they merely click on that sensitivity group and the group
will be grayed out. This indicates that access is not allowed. The default permissions
are set to deny access.
Figure 29: Same-As subject management user interface w/ obj grouping
After the permissions are set for the Same-As Example Friend, other like or similar
friends (Same-As Friends) are assigned to the policy. The visual policy editor presents
to the user their friend set, where the user can associate a friend to an already defined
Same-As Example Friend. Or, the user can designate a friend as a new Same-As
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Example Friend, thereby setting a new policy, which other similar friends would be
assigned. This process repeats itself for the user’s entire friend set. For example in
Figure 29, our visual policy editor depicts Same-As Example Friend “B” as having
access to the following sensitivity groups: Public, Private, Sensitive and Public minus
Bob. (Highly Sensitivity and Alice’s Eyes Only are grayed out and, therefore, access
is denied). All the Same-As Friends circled in blue inherit these same permissions.
We measured how many unique policy templates the user created, how long the
user took to author all their policies (to include grouping activities) and the conser-
vativeness of their policy set. After completing Tasks 4 and 5, the user completed a
second survey identical to the survey presented in Experiment 1.
Experiment 3: The third experiment was designed to evaluate Same-As Object
Management, as described in Section 4.5.1. This experiment also has two primary
tasks. See Table 11. In the first task (Task 6), the user was instructed to group
approximately 30 of their randomly selected friends in up to ten predefined friend
groups. In the second task (Task 7), the user was instructed, for a subset of their
pictures (approximately 15 randomly chosen ones), to select a Same-As Example
Picture, set appropriate allow / deny access permissions for this example picture and
assign the policy to appropriate like or similar pictures. This step was repeated as
necessary, i.e., for as many unique policies the user would like to assign for their
picture set. We measured how many unique policy templates the user created, how
long the user took to author all their policies (to include grouping activities) and
the conservativeness of their policy set. After completing Tasks 6 and 7, the user
completed a third survey identical to the survey presented in Experiment 1.
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Similarly, as described in Section 4.2.3.2, our user study participants were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We set up our prototype Facebook application as a
HIT, which included the three experiments as described in Section 4.5.2.1. Of the 99
participants, 61 were male and 38 were female. Most of our user participants were
young, fairly well educated and active Facebook users. 70% were between the ages of
18 to 25. 80% had between two and four years of college. Almost 87% used Facebook
daily. In addition, as part of the demographics portion of our survey, we collected
Westin privacy sentiment information. 9% of our participants were classified as Un-
concerned Users. 64% were Pragmatists and 27% were classified as Fundamentalists.
4.5.2.2 Results
We evaluated the three access control models: Subject / Object Grouping – here-
after referred to as Group Based (Experiment 1), Same-As Subject Management with
Object Grouping – hereafter referred to as Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping (Experi-
ment 2) and Same-As Object Management – hereafter referred to as Same-As Object
(Experiment 3). Using analysis of variance (ANOVA), we measured the effects of the
three approaches. For the Unconcerned user population, we observed no statistical
significance for the three experiments across all measurements. The remaining results
are summarized in the tables and figures that follow.
Number of Policy Templates: We measured how many unique policy templates a
user created as part of each experiment. A policy template is a collection of authoriza-
tions created by the user with semantic meaning established by the user. For Group
Based, unique policy templates equates to the number of sensitivity groups the user
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leverages. For Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping, unique policy templates equates to
the number of Same-As Example Friends the user creates and similarly for Same-As
Object, where the number of unique policy templates equates to number of Same-As
Example Pictures the user creates.
For Fundamentalists, there is no statistical significance (p = 0.06) with regard to
the number of policy templates the user generates. See Number of Policy Templates
section of Table 12. We do see statistical significance for Pragmatists (p < 0.01) and
the population as a whole (p < 0.01). The F-Statistics are greater than 3.04 (Prag-
matist) and 3.02 (All) for a probability of 95%. We also ran a pairwise comparison
leveraging the Bonferroni correction and observed no statistical significance between
Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping and Same-As Object. However, we do see statistical
significance between Group Based and Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping and Group
Based and Same-As Object. Table 13 summarizes the results of the pairwise compar-
ison. Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping and Same-As Object create approximately four
policy templates versus approximately three for Group Based. Figure 30(a) displays
the number of policy templates by experiment in the form of a box plot, where the
top and bottom of the box is the first and third quartiles respectively and the band
near the middle of the box is the median.
Policy Authoring Time: Next, we set out to measure how long it took a user to
author all their policies for each experiment. For Group Based, policy authoring time
included grouping of friends, grouping of pictures and setting of permissions. For
Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping, policy authoring time included grouping of pictures
and setting of permissions for friends using the Same-As Example Friend as the policy
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Table 12: Same-As object management user study results
Measure GB SaS SaO F − Statistic
w/ Obj Gping
µ µ µ p− value
Number of Policy Templates
Unconcerned 3.44 3.77 3.22 F(2,24)=0.34
p = 0.71
Pragmatist 3.44 4.69 4.47 F(2,186)=8.65
p < 0.01
Fundamen- 3.11 3.55 3.92 F(2,78)=2.89
talist p = 0.06
All 3.35 4.30 4.21 F(2,294)=9.71
p < 0.01
Policy Authoring Time (seconds)
Unconcerned 213.0 144.0 160.7 F(2,24)=2.25
p = 0.12
Pragmatist 223.3 157.8 177.8 F(2,186)=8.52
p < 0.01
Fundamen- 227.7 148.2 152.7 F(2,78)=5.47
talist p < 0.01
All 223.6 153.9 169.4 F(2,294)=15.84
p < 0.01
Policy Openness (see Definition 4)
Unconcerned 67.7 69.9 69.6 F(2,24)=0.01
p = 0.98
Pragmatist 67.8 56.8 53.2 F(2,186)=5.18
p < 0.01
Fundamen- 60.2 55.4 51.5 F(2,78)=1.24
talist p = 0.29
All 65.7 57.6 54.2 F(2,294)=5.13
p < 0.01
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Table 13: Same-As object management pairwise comparison
Measurement GB vs. GB vs. SaS vs.
SaS SaO SaO
p− value p− value p− value
Policy Templates < 0.01 < 0.01 1
Authoring Time < 0.01 < 0.01 0.70
Openness 0.08 < 0.01 1
Ease of Use 0.07 < 0.01 0.53
Readability < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Flexibility < 0.01 < 0.01 0.61
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Figure 30: Same-As object management user study results
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template. For Same-As Object, policy authoring time included grouping of friends
and setting of permissions for pictures using the Same-As Example Picture as the
policy template.
For Pragmatists, Fundamentalists and the population as a whole, we see statistical
significance as it pertains to policy authoring time – all p-values are less than 0.01
and F-Statistics are greater than 3.04 (Pragmatist), 3.11 (Fundamentalist) and 3.02
(All) for a probability of 95%. Refer to the Policy Authoring Time section of Table
12 and Figure 30(b). We also ran a pairwise comparison leveraging the Bonferroni
correction and observed no statistical significance between Same-As Subject w/ Obj
Gping and Same-As Object. However, we do see statistical significance between
Group Based and Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping and Group Based and Same-As
Object. See Table 13. Pragmatists, Fundamentalists and the population as a whole,
took less time authoring their policies with the Same-As approaches over the Group
Based approach. Overall, we see a 31% reduction in policy authoring time when using
Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping (153.9 seconds) versus Group Based (223.6 seconds).
We also see a 24% reduction in policy authoring time when using Same-As Object
(169.4 second) versus Group Based.
Policy Openness: We examined the openness of each user’s policy or conversely,
the conservativeness of a user’s policy. This measurement gives an indicator of the
restrictiveness (or not) of a user’s policy, where a measurement of 100% indicates a
totally permissive policy and a measurement of 0% indicates that the policy provides
no access. See Definition 4 for the definition of Policy Openness.
For Fundamentalists, there is no statistical significance as it pertains to Policy
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Openness (p = 0.29). See the Policy Openness section of Table 12 and Figure 30(c).
There is statistical significance for Pragmatists and the population as a whole; both
p-values are less than 0.01. In running a pairwise comparison, the only observed
statistical significance is between Group Based and Same-As Object. See Table 13.
Same-As Object policies were more conservative than Group Based policies, 54.2%
versus 65.7%.
Ease of Use: The user completed a brief survey designed to capture their per-
ceptions after each experiment. The question responses are on a Likert-scale of 1
(Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Each question is designed to capture the
user’s perceptions in the following areas: Ease of Use, Readability and Flexibility.
For Ease of Use, the user needs to be able to manage their access control policies in
an easy, intuitive and effective way such that they have a consistent experience. We
see statistical significance across all the user segments (minus Unconcerned) for Ease
of Use. See the Ease of Use section of Table 14 and Figure 31(a). However, in doing
a pairwise comparison, we only found statistical significance between Group Based
and Same-As Object. Refer back to Table 13. Overall, users found Same-As Object
easier to use than Group Based – 5.59 versus 4.92 on a seven point Likert-scale.
Readability: Not only does a policy management solution have to be easy to use,
it must be decipherable. For Readability, we see statistical significance across all the
user segments (minus Unconcerned). See the Readability section of Table 14 and
Figure 31(b). We also see significance across all experiment pairings. See Table 13.
Overall, users found Same-As Object (5.71) more readable than Same-As Subject w/
Obj Gping (5.20) than Group Based (4.64).
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Figure 31: Same-As object management user study results – perceptions
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Table 14: Same-As object management user study results – perceptions
Measure GB SaS SaO F − Statistic
w/ Obj Gping
µ µ µ p− value
Ease of Use (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned 5.02 5.38 5.37 F(2,24)=0.10
p = 0.90
Pragmatist 4.95 5.51 5.54 F(2,186)=4.13
p = 0.01
Fundamen- 4.82 4.92 5.77 F(2,78)=6.15
talist p < 0.01
All 4.92 5.34 5.59 F(2,294)=6.59
p < 0.01
Readability (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned 4.62 5.36 5.59 F(2,24)=1.05
p = 0.36
Pragmatist 4.53 5.19 5.62 F(2,186)=14.54
p < 0.01
Fundamen- 4.89 5.16 5.95 F(2,78)=7.21
talist p < 0.01
All 4.64 5.20 5.71 F(2,294)=21.45
p < 0.01
Flexibility (7 point Likert-scale)
Unconcerned 5.22 5.34 5.92 F(2,24)=0.52
p = 0.60
Pragmatist 4.92 5.44 5.52 F(2,186)=4.43
p = 0.01
Fundamen- 4.71 5.44 5.85 F(2,78)=7.64
talist p < 0.01
All 4.89 5.43 5.65 F(2,294)=10.17
p < 0.01
Flexibility: Policy management mechanisms must be flexible to accommodate the
user’s needs and intentions. For Flexibility, we see statistical significance across all the
user segments (minus Unconcerned). See the Flexibility section of Table 14 and Figure
31(c). We also ran a pairwise comparison and observed no statistical significance
between Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping and Same-As Object. However, we do see
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statistical significance between Group Based and Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping
and Group Based and Same-As Object. Refer back to Table 13. Overall, users found
Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping (5.43) and Same-As Object (5.65) more flexible than
the Group Based (4.89).
4.5.2.3 Discussion
Same-As Subject Management with Object Grouping improves upon Subject /
Object Grouping. We found that Group Based is more limiting in how a user may
express their policies. On average, users of Group Based only leverage three policy
templates versus four for Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping. Fewer policy templates
reflect that the user is authoring policies that aren’t as expressive as they would like
them to be. With Group Based, a user is being forced into expressing their policy
in a way that may not align with their mental model – how the user views a policy
versus how the access control model allows that policy to be expressed. We also see
this reflected in Figure 30(a) where Group Based has a smaller distribution of policy
templates versus Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping.
Group Based provides fewer options for expressing one’s policy. Same-As Subject
w/ Obj Gping provides a means that aligns with how the user views their policies.
Users are thinking about subjects (their friends) and the trust levels of those subjects
when they are thinking about setting access permissions. With Same-As Subject
w/ Obj Gping, users can create any number of different permutations for expressing
their policy, all aligning with their intentions. This is reflected in our Flexibility
measurement. On average, users gave higher ratings for flexibility to Same-As Subject
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w/ Obj Gping over Group Based. In access control terms, Same-As Subject w/ Obj
Gping has more expressive power for representing policies than does Group Based.
The expressiveness of Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping is also very readable com-
pared to Group Based. Using our visual policy editor, users are able to see the
summarized expressiveness of their policy in a format this is easy to understand.
With Group Based, a user must change between the different grouping and policy
views to get a comprehensive understanding of their policy. Our Same-As Subject w/
Obj Gping visual policy editor presents the policy in a single view providing a global
perspective to the user which is decipherable and aligns with their mental model.
This allows the user to construct policies that align with their intent.
Not only are users authoring more expressive policies, they are taking less time to do
so. We found that users are taking approximately 31% less time in authoring a policy
using Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping versus Group Based. One factor attributing to
this performance improvement is that with Group Based, a user must complete three
disjoint tasks, i.e., group subjects, group objects and set permissions. With Same-As
Subject w/ Obj Gping, a user first groups their objects. Then within one task, a user
authors their policy by setting permissions for their object groups using the Same-As
Example Subject as the policy template. With Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping, the
user is conducting fewer mental task switches. Conversely with Group Based, a user
must focus on their relationship with their subjects and how they should be organized
/ grouped. Next, the user must think about their objects and how they are similar
from a sensitivity perspective. Finally, the user must think about access permissions
when they are authoring their policies. With Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping, after
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grouping their objects, the user relies on their memory and opinion of their subjects
to set policies for other similar subjects. As a result, users can author policies much
faster.
As with Same-As Subject Management with Object Grouping, Same-As Object
Management also out performs Subject / Object Grouping for many of same reasons
discussed above. Same-As Object is similar to Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping in
that they both allow the user to author expressive policies which align with the user’s
mental model. With Same-As Object, the user generates a similar number of policy
templates (with similar distribution) as Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping. Same-As
Object is also equally as flexible as Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping in providing a
similar level of expressive power for representing policies over Group Based.
With regards to readability, users found Same-As Object not only more readable
than Group Based but also more readable than Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping. We
attribute this to the introduction of our new paradigm in how objects are managed
with Same-As Object. In both Group Based and Same-As Subject w/ Obj Gping,
objects are grouped in the traditional fashion, i.e., by some common property –
in our study, sensitivity level. Using Same-As Object, the user associates objects
with other like objects that possess a common user assigned subjective meaning of
sensitivity. The user assigns the importance of the object by associating it with an
easy to remember representative object, thus creating a level of abstraction based on
the user’s intent. In doing so, the policy is more readable and understandable to the
user. As a result, users are authoring more conservative policies. We see Same-As
Object policies to be more conservative (less open or permissive) than those policies
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authored using Group Based. Users are thinking about their objects in terms in which
they assign, which aligns with their mental model and intentions. Therefore, they are
more likely to create more expressive policies which are more least-privilege like, i.e.,
conservative.
All these factors attribute to the positive Ease of Use ratings received by the study
participants. Users found Same-As Object to be easier to use than Group Based.
Users found the new paradigm and visual policy editor simple to use and easy to
convey their access control intentions. As a result, users were able to author policies
in less time with Same-As Object over Group Based, where we measured a 24%
reduction in policy authoring time.
CHAPTER 5: APPLICATION POLICY MANAGEMENT
5.1 Social Networks Connect Services
Online social networking sites allow users to build social connections with family,
friends, co-workers, etc., hereafter referred to as friends or a social graph. These
online social networking sites also allow their users to build profiles for storing and
sharing various types of content with their friends, including photos, videos, mes-
sages, etc. Updating user profiles with interesting content is a form of self-expression
that increases the interaction between friends in social networking sites. In order to
encourage this interaction and to provide more rich content, social networking sites
expose their networks to web services in the form of online API’s. These API’s allow
third party developers to interface with the social networking site, access informa-
tion and media posted on user profiles, and build social applications that aggregate,
process, and create content based on users’ and friends’ interests.
Social networking sites are able to provide various application services that mash up
user profile data with third party data. Third party sites can rapidly distribute their
services via social networking sites in order to keep in touch with their users while
they are on these social networking sites. Moreover, users can now enjoy various
applications with content from numerous third party sites, see Figure 32. Clients
(social networking site users) access social networking sites where they maintain their
profiles. These profiles are retrieved by third party sites. The user provided content
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is enriched by the third party site and returned to the social network for consumption
by the user and, possibly, other friends. For example, Facebook users can share music
with friends, create play lists and get concert alerts on their profile page by installing
the third party music application iLike (www.iLike.com). This was the first step in
the evolution of social networks from a walled garden to a more open environment
aggregating content from a variety of sources.
Figure 32: Social network application
Major social networking sites have since launched new services such as Facebook
Platform, Google Friend Connect, and MySpaceID. We call these new services Social
Networks Connect Services. Social Networks Connect Services allow third party sites
to develop social applications and extend their services without having to either host
or build their own social network. This extension allows third party sites to leverage
the features of the social networking site. For example, third party sites can leverage
the authentication services provided by a social networking site. Users, therefore, are
not required to create yet another username and password to access the third party
site. They can just leverage their social network credentials and established profile
to include friends list. In another example, a client (social networking site user)
can access a third party site which leverages social network user profile content, see
Figure 33. The third party site retrieves users’ profiles from the social networking site
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returning to the clients an enhanced experience and enriched content. Third party
sites are able to increase membership by providing more interesting content from a
variety of sources in a seamless manner. Social Networks Connect Services further
break down the garden walls of social networking sites.
Figure 33: Social networks connect services
5.1.1 Framework
In order to better understand the Social Networks Connect Service, we begin by
describing user data in the social web. User data is composed of three types of infor-
mation: identity data, social graph data, and content data. Identity data describes
who I am in social the web including my identifier, my profile information, and my
privacy policy. Social graph data represents who I know in the social web including
my friendship connections with descriptions such as family, coworker, colleague, etc.
Content data represents what I have in the social web including my messages, photos,
videos and all other data objects created through various social web activities.
In order for social networking sites to be able to share user social web data with
other third party sites, a secure and reliable Social Networks Connect Services frame-
work is required. This framework is composed of a collection of API’s that allow third
party sites to interface with the social networking site. These API’s are grouped into
four categories:
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• Identity Authentication: Used to prove the identity of the user. Users can
authenticate using their existing accounts from various identity providers, to
include the social networking site.
• Authorization: Used to govern access to user data in the social web based on
pre-defined authorization access rights. The Authorization API allows third
party sites to create new content and extract existing content from the user’s
social web data.
• Streams: Allows third party sites to publish to users’ activity streams and vice
versa.
• Application: Allows third party sites to develop rich social features in the form
of applications and thus creating an extension of the social web.
 
Social Networks 
Connect Services
User Data in the 
Social Web
Figure 34: Social networks connect services framework
These four API’s make up the Social Networks Connect Services, see Figure 34.
The implementation of the services can vary widely using different protocols and
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technologies. In the next sections, we explore the Social Networks Connect Services
in Facebook, Google, and MySpace called Facebook Platform, Google Friend Connect,
and MySpaceID respectively.
5.1.2 Facebook Platform
Facebook Platform became generally available in December of 2008 under the Face-
book Connect brand. Since then, thousands of third party sites have implemented
it. Facebook Platform allows third party sites to integrate with Facebook and send
information both ways to create more engaging and rich social experiences on the
web. Facebook Platform allows users to bring their identity, profile, privacy policy,
social graph, and content from Facebook to third party sites, see Figure 35.
 
Facebook Platform 
Services
User Data in 
Facebook
Figure 35: Facebook platform services
Authentication is, by far, the most used component of Facebook Platform. This
API allows third party sites to leverage Facebook as an identity provider. For exam-
ple, Digg.com, a social news web site where users can share content, doesn’t require
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its new members to register and create a profile, see Figure 36, Step 1. New members
of Digg.com can just leverage their Facebook credentials to authenticate and use their
existing Facebook profile – Step 2. Once authenticated, users can extend their social
graph to the third party site and invite their friends (or link to them, if they are
already members) to join them on Digg.com – Step 3.
 
Figure 36: Digg.com authentication via Facebook platform
Facebook Platform leverages OAuth 2.0 for Authentication and Authorization [21].
OAuth 2.0 is a simplified and improved version of the standard that allows third party
sites to obtain authorization tokens from Facebook. First, a user of the third party site
authenticates using Facebook as an identity provider. Next, Facebook issues a token
that can be used by the third party site to access the user’s basic profile information
including name, profile picture, gender, and friend’s list. Extended permissions can be
requested by the third party site, depending on the specific application requirements,
e.g., permission to access the user’s activity stream like their Wall. (OAuth is further
discussed in Section 5.1.3.) Facebook user’s privacy policy settings are also applied
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through the third party site using Facebook’s dynamic privacy controls. The third
party site is able to provide the same privacy controls as on Facebook. For example,
if Alice does not allow Bob to access her content on Facebook, then Bob would not
be allowed to access Alice’s content on the third party site.
The Open Stream API allows third party sites to read and write to users’ activity
streams, e.g., read and write short messages on new events and activities for others in
the social web to consume. This API supports multiple stream publishing methods,
in addition to the Atom Feed standard. Third party sites can read content from a
user’s activity stream in addition to publishing to their activity streams. For exam-
ple, Facebook user activity on third party sites can be shared with their friends on
Facebook through their News Feeds.
Facebook allows developers to create social applications that interface with third
party sites. They provide a series of API’s and tools to assist developers in creating
these third party social applications (developers.facebook.com/docs). The pri-
mary API is Facebook’s Graph API. It allows third party applications to read and
write content objects (e.g., photos, friends, etc.), and the connections between them,
in Facebook’s social graph. The API is simple in the sense that it allows access to con-
tent objects via URLs. For example, with proper authorization, graph.facebook.
com/FBUserID/friends will provide access to FBUserID’s friends. Facebook also
provides support for the Representational State Transfer (REST) API. However, fu-
ture enhancements will mainly focus on the Graph API.
Facebook’s Social Plugins also enable traditional third party sites to easily trans-
form into the social web with only minimal HTML. The Like plugin allows third
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party site users to share pages / content back to their Facebook profile. The Rec-
ommendations plugin allows third party site users to suggest or recommend content
on the site. The Activity Feed plugin shows Facebook users what their friends Like.
Facebook also offers a variety of other Social Plugins including: Comments, Facepile,
Login with Faces, etc.
Facebook has a JavaScript Software Development Kit (SDK) consisting of classes
and methods that can be used to integrate third party sites using Facebook Platform.
Facebook also provides a series of tools that developers can use for building social
applications. Facebook Markup Language (FBML) is a proprietary variant of HTML
and Facebook Query Language (FQL) provides a quick and easy mechanism to query
Facebook user data without using API methods.
5.1.3 Google Friend Connect
Google Friend Connect was released approximately the same time as Facebook
Platform. And, like Facebook Platform, Google Friend Connect makes it easy to
share profile, social graph, and content data with third party sites (www.google.
com/friendconnect). Google Friend Connect takes a standards based decentralized
approach to facilitating the integration of social and non-social web sites. It uses
open standards like OpenID, OAuth, and OpenSocial (openid.net, oauth.net, www.
opensocial.org), see Figure 37.
Authentication services are provided using OpenID. OpenID takes a decentralized
approach for user authentication by using existing identity providers like Google,
Yahoo, and OpenID. Users can authenticate to third party sites using credentials
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Figure 37: Google friend connect services
that are issued by a supported OpenID identity provider. The user, therefore, doesn’t
have to go through the third party site new member registration process. After initial
authentication to the the third party site, the user then can select their existing profile
from a profile provider site like Plaxo. After which, they can import their social graph
from a social networking site such as Orkut and share their activities in the third party
site with a selected social graph. For example, if a user posts a message on a board in
a third party site, the message is only visible to friends in the selected social graph.
Google Friend Connect provides authorization services via OAuth, which is an
open standard that provides secure API authorization. OAuth provides granular
authorization control of user content in the social web based on privacy policies.
OAuth allows users to share their content hosted on a third party site without having
to provide a username and password to the requesting site. Authorization tokens are
issued to a specific site for a specific content object for a specified time. For example,
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assume Site A houses photos on behalf of a user and Site B requires access to these
photos. Site B requests access from the user who then authorizes the access request
by authenticating to Site A and authorizing Site B’s access request. Site A will then
issue an authorization token for the photos to site B. Site B never gains access to the
user’s Site A credentials.
Google Friend Connect uses OpenSocial to provide support for activity streams.
This API is used to read and write to a user’s activity stream on Google Friend
Connect sites. This enables users to see what their friends are up to and to share
what they are doing. For example, a blog site leveraging Google Friend Connect can
publish activities to a variety of OpenSocial sites. See Figure 38 for a screen shot of
a blog site user profile page that leverages Google Friend Connect – notice options to
Connect with friends from social networks... and an option to Publish my activities...
The OpenSocial API’s are used by Google Friend Connect to build social applica-
tions. OpenSocial was developed primarily by Google with the support of a number
of other social networking sites including MySpace, Hi5, etc. The primary objective
of OpenSocial is to create a platform that allows social applications to integrate with
a number of different social networking sites. Thus, developers of third party sites can
create a social application that can integrate with a variety of OpenSocial containers
like MySpace, Hi5, LinkedIn, Orkut, etc. The advantage of OpenSocial is that social
applications can potentially reach more users if they integrate with multiple container
sites. And, theoretically, users will have access to more social applications.
OpenSocial’s client side API leverages standard web development technologies like
JavaScript, HTML, AJAX, etc. Server side development is accomplished via the
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Figure 38: Google friend connect blog site profile page
RESTful data API’s. These API’s expose three primary sets of data: 1) People and
Friends – who I am and who I know (Social Graph), 2) My Activities – discussed
above, and 3) Persistence – providing the ability to read and write data with your
friends (Content).
A simpler mechanism used by many sites that adopt Google Friend Connect is to
insert gadgets into their third party sites’ pages. A gadget is a client side HTML /
JavaScript applet. A third party site can quickly add social features by just integrat-
ing a few snippets of code into their site. Different social gadgets, such as a rating
gadget – giving users the ability to rate a movie, easily transform the third party
site from the web to the social web. The limitation of this approach is that gadgets
cannot access social graphs or content. The JavaScript or RESTful data API’s must
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be used to overcome this limitation.
5.1.4 MySpaceID
MySpace has aligned with Google’s open standards approach to social web de-
velopment relying on standards such as OpenID, OAuth, and OpenSocial to share
profile, social graph, and content data with third party sites (developer.myspace.
com/myspaceid), see Figure 39. MySpaceID allows users to login to third party sites
using their MySpace credentials. In addition, it enables MySpace users to share their
profiles and social graphs with third party sites. MySpaceID also provides support
for activity streams. OpenSocial and MySpace’s own RESTful API’s are the primary
resources for creating third party social applications. Since, MySpace is an OpenSo-
cial container, MySpace user data is easily accessible to any third party site using the
OpenSocial standard.
 
Figure 39: MySpaceID connect services
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5.1.5 Comparison
Facebook Platform, Google Friend Connect, and MySpaceID enable third party
sites to integrate with the social web without having to build their own social net-
work. Using these connection services, social networks users are able to leverage their
existing identity, profile, social graph and content on these third party sites. More-
over, these connection services provide social web integration technologies to third
parties in the form of suites of API’s and tools.
One difference between Facebook / MySpace’s approach and Google Friend Con-
nect, is that Google Friend Connect uses decentralized identity, profile, and social
graph providers. Facebook and MySpace leverage their social network platforms for
user data in the social web. By using decentralized identity, profile, and social graph
providers, users can leverage specialty providers selecting the best of all possible
worlds. Users can customize their presence on the social web. The down side to
a decentralized approach is that users must maintain their social data in multiple
locations increasing administration costs. Using a single provider, like Facebook or
MySpace, cuts down on this administrative overhead. But, a single provider limits
the user’s capabilities and choices to just that of the one provider.
Google and MySpace take an open standards approach while Facebook has tradi-
tionally taken a proprietary approach; but, most recently, Facebook has adopted the
use of OAuth. Social applications that take an open standards approach, theoreti-
cally, can reach more users because there are many standards based service providers
giving access to more users. However, these users are spread across a variety of service
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providers. Having millions of users within one service provider, as Facebook does,
provides significant mass in the overall social web. Third party sites want access
to Facebook’s membership because developing one integration gives access to a ex-
tremely large user base. See Table 15 for an overview of the different Social Networks
Connect Services.
Table 15: Social networks connect services comparison
Facebook Platform Google Friend Connect MySpaceID
Auth. - single service provider - multiple service providers - single service provider
& w/ 100’s of millions users w/ 100’s of millions of users w/ millions of users
Auth. - open standard: - open standards: - open standards:
OAuth OpenID & OAuth OpenID & OAuth
Streams - full support - full support - full support
- proprietary - open standard: - open standard:
OpenSocial OpenSocial
App. - full suite of tools - full suite of tools - full suite of tools
& API’s & API’s & API’s
- proprietary - open standard: - open standard:
OpenSocial OpenSocial
5.1.6 Open research security challenges
Because of Social Networks Connect Services, the social web is growing exponen-
tially. With this growth, comes challenges to include security and privacy challenges.
In this section, we introduce some of these challenges. We briefly describe the chal-
lenges, discuss them, high-light select related work, and offer ideas that may lead to
solutions. Our goal is to introduce open research security challenges that have arisen
from the introduction of Social Networks Connect Services.
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5.1.6.1 Identity Mapping
Effective user identity mapping between social networking and third party sites
is one of challenges in social web. Users have multiple identities scattered across
various social networking and third party sites. For new users of third party sites,
Social Networks Connect Services eliminates the need for a cumbersome registration
process. Social Networks Connect Services also supports the scenario where a user
has an existing account on a third party site and would like to link it to an existing
account on a social networking site, thus providing a seamless social web experience.
For example, Facebook provides a method that creates an association between an
existing user account on a third party site and the user’s Facebook account. To link
these two accounts (assuming the third party site and Facebook have the user’s email
addresses), the two email hash values are compared. If the hash values match, the
two accounts are linked and are considered the same owner’s accounts. This approach
is also used to find user’s friends between social networking and third party sites. If
a user uses the same email address between a social networking and a third party
site, this email hash based mapping approach is sufficient to accurately create a link.
However, if a user uses a different email address on the social networking site than the
third party site, the email hash based mapping approach will not work. Moreover,
if the user’s friends use different email addresses, linking friends’ accounts is almost
impossible.
The mapping of friends’ accounts is especially important in protecting user’s privacy
on the social web. Currently, existing identity mapping methods are not perfect
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and have many shortcomings. For example, as mentioned above, email hash based
mapping is only applicable when users’ friends are using the same email address on
the social networking sites as on third party sites. One ideal solution is that all
users use a global unique identity offered by an OpenID service provider. However,
implementation and acceptance would be quite difficult.
Researchers have investigated attribute based identity mapping. But, Wang et al.
[70] revealed that incomplete records with many missing data elements would signifi-
cantly increase the error rate of the record comparison algorithm. This is a common
limitation of many identity matching techniques that only use personal attributes.
Xu et al. [74] showed that combining social features with personal features could
improve the performance of criminal identity matching. However, this approach may
not be reliable in today’s social web since the quality of user attributes in profiles is
low due to deception, errors, or missing attributes.
Mapping multiple identities issued by different identity providers is another issue
in Social Networks Connect Service. Google Friend Connect provides authentication
services using multiple identity providers. If a user logins into a third party site
using one identity provider and then later logins into the same third party site using
a different identity provider (assuming the user has identities with both providers),
the third party site will treat this user as two separate identities and the user will
have two profiles, two activity streams, two sets of friends, etc. Also, given the fact
that most users easily forget their usernames and passwords, adding an additional
dimension (select your identity provider) will further burden the user.
Identity mapping techniques that overcome the limitations of existing approaches
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are necessary to effectively manage user’s and user’s friends identities in the social
web. An effective friend mapping technique will enhance the user’s privacy protection
since it will provide correct friends’ accounts linking and therefore allow users to
effectively control their friends’ accesses in the social web.
5.1.6.2 User Data Portability
Most social web users have multiple profiles and social graphs on different sites and
most of them are not interlinked. Users may need to maintain multiple profiles and
social graphs based on the context of the social networking site. For example, a user
may have an account on Facebook to keep in touch with family and friends – with one
profile and set of friends. The same user may also have an account on LinkedIn for
professional reasons – with a totally different profile and set of colleagues. Maintain-
ing multiple profiles and social graphs across different social networking sites can be
a burdensome chore. One possible solution could allow for users to maintain a global
profile and social graph in one place. The user could then create sub-profiles tailored
around a specific community (e.g., family / friends, professional colleagues, etc.) set-
ting appropriate privileges on these sub-profiles depending on the intended audience.
There are challenges with this approach: identification of single profile repository,
duplicate profile attribute resolution, multiple profile attribute name space mapping,
and mapping of friends / colleagues across different social graphs. Sutterer et al.
[64] propose a user profile ontology that describes situation dependent sub-profiles.
This ontology is designed to be leveraged in context aware environments. It struc-
tures a user profile into situation dependent sub-profiles and delivers the appropriate
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sub-profile based on the specific environment or context. Their ontology is primarily
geared for the personalization of services on mobile communications platforms. But,
a similar approach may be applicable to the social web. For example, a user could
maintain a global profile with multiple sub-profiles that are made available dependent
on the context of the site being visited.
5.1.6.3 Common Enhanced Privacy Policy Framework
Social Networks Connect Services have rapidly expanded the social web into a very
large online community. Opening the user’s social web data to third party sites with
an immature privacy policy framework creates significant privacy issues and concerns.
Social networking and third party sites have their own access control mechanisms with
privacy policies that are composed using different and incompatible policy languages.
Therefore, it is difficult to apply a consistent privacy policy between social networking
sites and third party sites.
Current implementations of Social Networks Connect Services have very primitive
privacy policy capabilities, i.e., limited ability to set and enforce a policy on user
data in the social web. Facebook Platform extends users’ privacy policies to social
applications hosted on third party sites, but only if the social application developer
fully implements these capabilities. Google Friend Connect and MySpaceID have an
even more immature and basic approach to managing the privacy of user profiles and
content. Maintaining user privacy policies using current implementations of Social
Networks Connect Service is not trivial.
Privacy policies are expressed as access control policies which can be composed
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in policy languages using policy management tools. Several researchers have inves-
tigated access control systems for sharing content in the social web. Lockr [67] is
an access control scheme based on social relationships which regulates the sharing
of personal content in social web. It separates content delivery and sharing from
managing social networking information and lets users manage a single social graph
with access control lists (ACLs). A person who has a social relationship described
in an ACL can access the shared content under the Lockr system. Mannan et al.
[44] propose an access control model based on an existing ”circle of trust ” in Instant
Messaging (IM) networks. Sun et al. [63] propose a system for content sharing in
the social web where users leverage their email accounts as an OpenID identity and
content owners use their email based contact lists to specify access policies in Open-
Policy providers. These proposed models have their limitations. For example, they
enforce access control based on a single social graph from an email contact list, IM,
or a social networking site and are not applicable across multiple social graphs.
Designing a generic privacy policy framework for social networking and third party
sites is a challenge. OAuth has propelled authentication and authorization in the
social web forward. We’ve see how the community developed an open authorization
protocol that is being widely deployed in the social web. An open privacy policy
framework would also need to be designed and developed by the community in a
similar fashion. However, without collaboration and cooperation of the community, a
consistent privacy policy framework in social web would be difficult to attain. How-
ever, even with open collaboration, there are challenges in building an open privacy
policy framework: detailed access control methods which include fine-grained con-
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trols, compatible policy languages, and a consistent user experience.
5.1.6.4 Cascaded Authorization
Many internet sites provide mashup services, i.e., a service that combines data or
functionality from two or more third party sites to provide a new enhanced aggre-
gated service. Third party sites that implement Social Networks Connect Services
are required to obtain the user’s consent prior to being authorized to retrieve the
user’s social web data. Third party sites frequently rely on other third party sites
to provide services, which require the sharing of user data from one third party site
to another. Using the current authentication and authorization approaches would
require the user to consent multiple times – one for each third party site accessing
their data. This approach is very cumbersome and time consuming. To enhance the
user’s experience and privacy in sharing data with mashup based services, a cascaded
authorization mechanism is necessary that would obtain a user’s consent once for a
specific content object and that authorization would cascade to all third party sites
that use that content object as part of the mashup service.
The current state of the art is the 4-legged authentication of OAuth 2.0 [21] which
enables third party sites to generate and share authentication tokens to delegate
access rights to other third party sites. The challenges raised by this approach are
that it requires the user to trust third party sites into making authentication decisions
on behalf of the them. OAuth for Recursive Delegation [69] is a proposed extension
of OAuth that allows a client (or third party site) to delegate the authorization it
received from the user to another client. However, this is an emerging standard with
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no concrete implementations.
To ensure the security and privacy of the user, Social Networks Connect Services
need to provide easy to use fine-grained access control techniques that enable the user
to decide which attributes are to be shared with what third party sites. Furthermore,
the user will need to be able to track and control all third party site accesses and
delegated accesses.
5.1.6.5 Privacy in Social Plugins
Social Networks Connect Services enable users to share not only site URLs, events,
and photos with other users, they also allow users to share their opinions. For exam-
ple, a user watching a Youtube video is able to share that he likes this video with his
friends on the social web. Furthermore, the user is able to share comments posted on
Youtube with friends too. Facebook’s Social Plugins (discussed in Section 5.1.2) are
widely deployed. Several third party sites are adopting the thumbs-up Like button
to enable users to easily post their opinions on these sites. The “liked” web object is
referenced and shared using the object URL, which makes it easy for a user’s friends
to check the shared object. Even though, this enables the seamless sharing of user
opinions, it does not provide for data integrity guarantees. For example, what hap-
pens if the content of the “liked” object changes after a user indicates that they liked
such content? The lack of integrity guarantees when using Social Plugins is a user
privacy concern. Adequate controls for Social Plugins guaranteeing integrity is an
open research security challenge.
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5.2 iLayer: Application Access Control Framework
5.2.1 Preliminaries
5.2.1.1 Content Management Systems
A Content Management System (CMS) is an online application that provides users
the ability to easily create, design, publish and manage the content of a web site or
social networking site. In addition, content management systems manage work flow
allowing for collaboration. Users of content management systems are not required to
have an in depth technical knowledge of web design or programming languages. Users
traditionally just leverage a browser based interface to easily build and manage the
content of a web site or social networking site. Content management systems support
multiple users with varying roles, e.g., content contributors, content consumers, site
administrators, etc.
There are both commercial and open source varieties of content management sys-
tems on the market today including Joomla, WordPress, MediaWiki, Plone and Dru-
pal. They are deployed in various forms supporting a variety of different market
segments including online publishing, online social networking, enterprise content
management, and document management. Content management systems support
many companies, government entities and academic institutions. For instance, White-
house.gov, Popular Science Magazine and the New York Observer web sites are all
powered by Drupal [13]. Joomla supports several notable web sites including Harvard
University and the United Nations Regional Information Center [28].
Third party applications expand the capabilities and functionalities of content man-
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agement systems. There are thousands of applications available for most CMS plat-
forms providing functionality like news publishing, location mapping, photo galleries,
etc. Few formal application development security practices are in place, e.g., code
reviews of third party applications, etc. There are some secure coding guidelines
available [60, 3, 52, 27]. But, there is little enforcement of their use.
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Figure 40: Content management system overview
Typically, a CMS consists of four components: Presentation Layer, set of Core
Components, Function Library and Database Layer. See Figure 40. What follows is
a brief description of each:
1. Presentation Layer: Displays to the visitor of the web site / social networking
site the output (or content) of the CMS. Typically, templates populated with
content are used to facilitate the creation of the web site / social networking
site.
2. Core Components: Provides foundational CMS functionality including basic
content management, user management, application administration, session
management, etc.
3. Function Library / API: Library of functions that perform various tasks (e.g.,
database calls, etc.). In addition, an Application Programming Interface (API)
is provided for interfacing with third party applications.
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4. Database Layer: Stores all content such as users’ profiles, blogs, files, etc. It
also contains configuration and policy management information.
One of the primary benefits of most content management systems is that they can
easily be expanded to include additional functionality. Content management systems
publish their API’s which allow third party developers to create applications that
interface with the CMS. These third party applications provide additional capabilities.
For example, a third party developed calendar application can provide user scheduling
management. Or, a third party developed mapping application can provide location
information for a restaurant web site. More often than not, these applications are
free to the community to download, install and use.
5.2.1.2 Application Access Control Approaches
Content management systems provide user access control and management capabil-
ities. However, access control functionality for third party applications is not as well
developed. Third party applications can, and in some cases do, have full administra-
tor level access to the web site’s content and data, e.g., configuration information, user
information, passwords, etc. CMS platforms, such as WordPress, Plone and Joomla,
allow web site administrators to easily install third party applications. But, most
CMS platforms advise the administrative user to secure their database and server
configurations and change all the default passwords after installing new versions of
software [73, 54, 28]. CMS platforms have traditionally addressed application access
control as an after thought.
Third party applications developed for WordPress have full access to the content
management system and the database, unless restricted through file permissions.
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There is no mechanism where an administrative user can set permissions during the
installation of a third party application. File permissions are not handled through
a designated WordPress screen. Instead, the administrative user must set the file
permissions via the command line of an operating system shell. The administrative
user needs to find the right balance between restrictive and lax permissions [73].
Application and WordPress software functionality is affected if permissions are too
strict. Permissions that are too lax present a security risk. The skills to set these
permission levels is not universal among CMS administrators. Managing third party
application access in WordPress is not trivial and can be easily misconfigured.
Joomla is another CMS platform that allows third party developed applications
to interface with its content management system. The administrative user must also
use file permissions to control the access given to these applications [28]. Other than
file permissions prohibiting access, third party application access is not explicitly
controlled. There is not a permissions granting process during installation either.
Thus, even though there are methods that allow web site administrators to control
the access of third party developed applications, they are limited in capability and
are not very easy to use. The administrative user would need to understand and
translate the access requirements of the third party application into file permissions
(e.g., in the case of Joomla) and, possibly, database and server configurations. This
is not an easy undertaking and, more often than not, administrators take minimal
or no action to secure their web sites from third party developed applications. The
average web site administrator may not have sufficient skills or experience to know all
of the risks associated with third party applications and how they may impact their
115
web site.
5.2.2 Framework
We investigated the access control mechanisms that govern access to online infor-
mation from third party applications developed for content management systems. In
order to improve the security of content management systems, we introduce iLayer
– a Policy Management Assistance Tool. iLayer is a least privilege based model
that protects content management systems from third party developed applications.
iLayer makes policy recommendations to CMS administrative user for third party
applications. These policies are reviewed and set by the CMS administrative user
and enforced by the iLayer Framework.
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Figure 41: iLayer architecture
iLayer’s primary goal is to set and enforce least privilege access for third party de-
veloped applications that integrate with content management systems. A subsequent
design goal of iLayer is ease of use with minimal administration while enhancing the
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security of the content management system. iLayer’s Architecture has two primary
components: Reference Monitor and a corresponding Policy. See Figure 41. The
reference monitor controls all access from third party applications to the database.
Basically, the reference monitor verifies that third party application database requests
are allowed by the policy. There are three primary steps in establishing the architec-
ture: iLayer Setup, Third Party Application Installation and Runtime Enforcement.
See Figure 42.
Step A – iLayer Setup Step B – Third Party Application Installation
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Figure 42: Establishing the iLayer architecture
5.2.2.1 iLayer Setup
The first step in installing the iLayer Architecture within a CMS platform is creat-
ing a table in the database to store and manage the iLayer Policy. A policy is made
up of three components:
• subject: third party application that will be granted access
• object: database table being given access to
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• permission: access privilege that is granted which could be either:
1. read (select)
2. write (delete, insert, update)
3. read & write
After the policy table is set up, all core CMS platform functions that perform
database calls are identified in the CMS Function Library, e.g., core(arg), where arg
contains the database table name and the requested action, i.e., select, delete, insert,
or update. After which, the core functions are refactored [19], i.e., a corresponding
i core(3PA Params, arg) function is added to the CMS Function Library for each
core function that makes a database call, e.g., core(arg). The i core(3PA Params,
arg) function will have the same arguments as its corresponding core function with
the addition of the calling third party application parameters, where:
3PA_Params = array( 
"name" => "Application Name is...",
"id" => "Application ID is...", 
... 
) 
The i core function performs a policy check. If the policy is violated, access to
the requested database table is denied and an error message is returned. If the
policy is not violated, the i core function calls its corresponding core function and
operation proceeds normally. Figure 43 shows a code sample of a core function and
its corresponding i core function.
5.2.2.2 Third Party Application Installation
After the iLayer is setup within a CMS platform, third party applications can be in-
stalled. The first step in the installation process is the determination of the requested
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Original core() 
 
function core(arg) {  
   ...  
   //extract table name and 
   action from the arg 
   ...  
}  
Refactored core() to i_core() 
 
function i_core(3PA_Params, arg) {  
     ...  
     //extract table name and  
     action from the arg 
     //loop for all table names 
     if(matchPolicy(3PA_Params, table, action) = null) 
             errorHandler(); 
          else 
 core(arg); 
 
} 
Figure 43: Refactoring core function
access by the third party application. Policy recommendations are then presented
to the CMS administrative user for review and the policy is selected and approved
by the CMS administrative user. After which, the third party application code is
parsed and all instances of core functions are replaced with their corresponding i core
functions. Finally, the remaining installation steps for the third party application
proceed normally.
1. Determination of Requested Access: Two approaches are leveraged in determin-
ing the requested access by the third party application: 1) Manifest provided by the
third party developer and 2) Application access analysis. A manifest is a file provided
by the third party application developer that outlines the required and optional appli-
cation privileges; the application developer declares all of the application’s database
accesses. The manifest is stored in XML format and contains a set of (subject, object,
permissions, required flag, comments) policy rule tuples. Figure 44 displays a sample
file.
The required flag indicates whether the access is required for the proper execution of
the application. If the flag is not set, the comments field can be used by the developer
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<manifest> 
<policy_rule id="pr1"> 
<subject>appName</subject> 
<object>birthday_table</object> 
<permission>select</permission> 
<required_flag>0</required_flag> 
<comments>Access is not required; but...</comments> 
</policy_rule> 
<policy_rule id="pr2"> 
… 
</policy_rule> 
</manifest> 
Figure 44: Sample manifest file
to elaborate on the optional nature of the access, e.g., “Access to birthday table is
not mandatory; but if access is not provided, ages will not be displayed.”
Regardless of whether a manifest is available, the application code is statically
analyzed at installation time for all database calls. Similarly as for the manifest,
the output of the application access analysis is a set of (subject, object, permissions)
policy rule tuples that describe the third party application database accesses, e.g.,
(application name, database table name, read). In addition to identifying all database
calls, all called third party applications functions are identified and their respective
iLayer Policies are retrieved from the policy repository.
2. Setting the Policy: The manifest and the output of the application access
analysis (to include all called application iLayer Policies) are presented to the CMS
administrative user as a series of policy rule tuples. In addition, CMS administrative
users are presented with additional information to assist them in making their policy
decisions. For each policy rule tuple, a thumbs up or thumbs down policy rule rec-
ommendation is presented, where a thumbs up recommends adoption of the policy
rule tuple and a thumbs down does not. This recommendation is an indicator of the
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community’s usage of the policy rule tuple.
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001 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0 
002 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 0 
003 1 1 1 0 0 0  0 1 
…          
412 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 1 
413 0 0 0 0 0 0  ? ? 
Figure 45: Historically granted accesses of third party applications
Policy Rule Recommendation: The thumbs up/down policy rule recommendation
is based on the maximum likelihood of the set of possible permission combinations
for all requested objects based on historically granted accesses. Let A equal the
set of all possible accesses that can be requested by third party applications, A =
{a1, a2, . . . , an}, where ai is an object to permission pairing, e.g., sessions-read. Let λ
equal the set of all previously granted third party application accesses, where λ ⊆ A.
Figure 45 displays a sample of previously or historically granted accesses (Application
IDs 001 to 412), where the decision variable:
xi =

1 if ai is granted
0 if otherwise
When installing a third party application, the set of requested accesses (object-
permission pairings) is denoted by R, where R ⊆ A. In our framework, the set R is
obtained from the application access analysis and / or the manifest. For example,
in Figure 45, Application ID 413 is being installed and R = {files-read, files-write}.
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R̄ denotes the set of accesses that were not requested. The accesses that were not
requested (R̄) are automatically not granted to the third party application.
The policy rule recommendation for the requested accesses is computed based on
statistically examining the set λ. Without the loss of generality, letR = {a1, a2, . . . , ar−1}
and let R̄ = {ar, ar+1, . . . , an}. The decision is not to grant R̄ – therefore, using the
decision variable, R̄ = {xr = 0, xr+1 = 0, . . . , xn = 0}. For R, the values (or recom-
mendations) for x1, x2, . . . , xr−1 are computed by:
X = arg max
x1,...,xr−1
P (xr = 0, . . . , xn = 0 | x1, . . . , xr−1)
X = {x1, . . . , xr−1} is the set of recommended accesses that maximize the condi-
tional probability of the set of accesses that were not requested (or granted) given
the possible permission combinations for all requested objects taking into consider-
ation the historically granted accesses λ. In other words, this mechanism chooses
the recommendations X that are most probable based on historical accesses. For
example, Application ID 413 requests two accesses {files-read, files-write}, see Figure
45. There are four possible recommendations, see Figure 46. The conditional prob-
ability P (R̄|X) is computed for each possible recommendation combination. In our
example, allowing both requested accesses {files-read, files-write} are recommended
because this combination has the maximum probability.
For each access xi, the policy rule recommendation is presented to the CMS admin-
istrative user in the form of a thumbs up/down where a thumbs up recommends the
adoption of the requested object-permission pairing xi and conversely for a thumbs
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files - read files - write X   | 
deny deny {x1 =  0, x2 =  0} 0 
deny allow {x1 =  0, x2 =  1} 0 
allow deny {x1 =  1, x2 =  0} .2 
allow allow {x1 =  1, x2 =  1} .5 
 
Figure 46: Recommendation computation example
down. For example, if xi = 1, a thumbs up is presented to the CMS administrative
user signifying a recommendation for this access request and a thumbs down would
be presented when xi = 0.
The number of conditional probability computations equal 2n, where n equal the
number of requested accesses. Our research shows that the number of requested
accesses n is relatively small and therefore manageable from a computational per-
spective. Figure 47 shows the distribution of the number of accesses (database table-
permission) for 412 Drupal modules (third party applications). The average number
of accesses is 2.45 and the median is 2.
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Figure 47: Accesses of Drupal modules
Policy Decision: All the policy rule tuples are presented to the CMS administrative
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user who can then can review each and grant the appropriate access as necessary, see
Figure 50 for an example screen shot. After reviewing and granting access for each
policy rule tuple, the CMS administrative user has two options:
• Approve all selected access: All selected accesses (from both the manifest file
and the application access analysis) are approved and the policy is written to
the iLayer policy table.
– Note: Required accesses (as specified in the manifest file) cannot be dis-
allowed. The only option, other than allowing the required accesses, is to
“Deny all access”.
– Note: When only application access analysis is presented, some knowledge
of the third party application is required; otherwise, selectively disallowing
access could lead to unpredictable behavior at execution.
• Deny all access: All access presented is denied and installation of the application
is terminated.
3. Function Parsing and Replacement: After the policy is composed and stored in
the iLayer policy table, the third party application code is parsed and all instances of
core functions are replaced with their corresponding i core functions that were added
to the CMS Function Library during the iLayer Setup phase. The remaining native
installation steps for the third party application are unchanged and the installation
of the application proceeds normally.
5.2.2.3 Runtime Enforcement
Upon execution of the third party application, the iLayer Reference Monitor en-
forces the iLayer Policy that was set at installation time. The default action of the
reference monitor is to deny all access, i.e., if there does not exist an explicit permit
statement in the policy, the reference monitor denies all access attempts. During ex-
ecution time, the i core functions are called and thus invoke a policy check for every
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database call. The i core function takes the third party application name and the
query arguments as its parameter. It will then extract the table name, action (select,
delete, insert, or update) from the query arguments and try to establish a match
with one of the policy statements in the iLayer policy table. If a match is found, the
corresponding core function is called and normal operations are allowed to proceed.
Otherwise, an errorHandler is called to display an access denied error message to the
user.
5.2.3 CMS Application Access Control Prototype
5.2.3.1 Drupal Overview
We prototyped our application access control framework on Drupal. Drupal is a
popular open source CMS platform capable of providing a wide range of services,
from personal web sites to the foundation of a social networking site. Like other
CMS platforms, Drupal has a mature user-based access control framework. Also, like
other CMS platforms, third party applications allow Drupal web site administrative
users to add custom capabilities and features. And, similarly to other CMS platforms,
Drupal has very limited third party application access control capabilities – mainly
only in the form of file permissions.
Using the concepts of modules, nodes and hooks, Drupal provides an abstracted ap-
proach to handling web content and functionality [68]. Drupal is based on a modular
framework. Its functionality is provided in the form of these modules or applications.
Modules can be part of the base installation – built in core modules. Modules can
also be developed by the Drupal community, called contributed modules and previ-
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ously referred to as third party applications. See Figure 48. There are thousands of
contributed modules available for download. These modules expand the functionality
of Drupal. But, they also increase the attack surface and thus potentially increase
the risk of compromise.
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Figure 48: Drupal iLayer architecture
The primary way to access Drupal functionality is via hooks implemented in mod-
ules. In the most basic sense, hooks act as functions and are stored in the Hook
Library. Drupal functionality is usually delivered in the form of content. A node in
Drupal is a piece of content. Drupal supports many different node types, e.g., blog
node type, page node type, story node type, etc. The characteristics of each node (or
piece of content) is inherited from a node type. Therefore, managing content by node
type impacts all nodes of that type. For instance, in order to add a user access rule
for a blog entry node, the administrative user only needs to modify the blog node
type and the change will propagate to all of the other blogs on the site.
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5.2.3.2 Drupal iLayer Setup
The first step in implementing the iLayer Architecture in Drupal is setting up the
policy table. We created a table called iLayer policy. Policy statements are stored in
the policy table and are made up of three components: the module name (subject), the
database table name (object) and the access request (permission). Next, all the core
Drupal hooks (functions) that perform database calls are identified and refactored.
We chose to refactor the db query() hook for our prototype because db query() is
the main Drupal hook that every module uses in order to execute a database call /
query. We added the refactored db query() hook, idb query(), to the Drupal Hook
Library. It has the same arguments as db query() with the addition of the calling
module name. The idb query() hook performs a policy check. If the policy is not
violated, idb query() forwards the call to the original db query() hook and operation
proceeds normally. If the policy is violated, access to the requested table is denied
and an error message is returned. See Figure 49 for a code sample of db query() and
its corresponding idb query() hook.
5.2.3.3 Contributed Module Installation
After the iLayer Architecture has been setup on the Drupal platform, we then can
install third party applications or contributed modules. One Drupal module we in-
stalled in our prototype was Flash Node [20]. Flash Node allows CMS administrative
users to easily add flash content to their sites. As part of the module installation
process, the access control policy is presented to the CMS administrative user. Since
Flash Node doesn’t come with a developer generated manifest file that declares the re-
127
 
Original db_query() 
 
function db_query($query) {  
   … 
   //extract table name and 
   action from the $query 
 
   return _db_query($query); 
}  
Refactored db_query() to idb_query() 
 
function idb_query($moduleID, $query) {  
     … 
     //extract table name and  
     action from the $query 
     //loop for all table names 
     foreach($strArray as $key => $table_name) {  
          $action = 0;    // 0 is read, 1 is write 
          if($strArray[0] ==”select”) $action = 0; else $action = 1;  
          …         
          $result = db_query("SELECT count(*) as cnt  
               FROM {iLayer_policy} WHERE  
               moduleID = '%s' and 
               tableName = '%s' and  
               grantAccess = %d", 
               $moduleID, $table_name, $action);  
          $row = db_fetch_object($result);  
          if($row->cnt  < 1) 
               //no match found; display error; return null 
     } 
     //after all matches found, forward call to original _db_query 
     return _db_query($query);     
} 
Figure 49: Refactoring db query function
quired and optional accesses for the module, application access analysis is performed
to determine the requisite database calls for Flash Node. The output of the static
analysis is presented to the CMS administrative user for review and action, see Figure
50. The CMS administrative user is presented the module policy in the form of a
subject (Flash Node), object (Table Name) and permissions (select, delete, insert, up-
date) policy rule tuple. The CMS administrative user reviews the policy, to include
the policy rule recommendation in the form of a thumbs up/thumbs down, where
thumbs up means the policy rule is recommended and conversely for a thumbs down.
After which, the CMS administrative user grants the appropriate access by checking
the box for each selected policy rule tuple and then clicks on Approve all selected
access. The policy is written to the iLayer policy table. After which, all instances
of db query() in the Flash Node module are replaced by the refactored idb query()
hook. The remaining native Flash Node module installation steps proceed normally.
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Figure 50: iLayer policy review page
5.2.3.4 Runtime Enforcement
Upon execution of the Flash Node module, database accesses are made by calling
idb query(). The idb query() hook takes the module name and query arguments as
its parameters. The called database table name and action (select, delete, insert,
or update) are extracted from the query arguments. These two parameters coupled
with the module name are used as criteria to find a policy statement match in the
iLayer policy table. If a matching policy statement is found, access to the table is
granted and execution proceeds normally. If a policy statement is not found, an error
message is displayed and access to the requested table is disallowed.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Access control mechanisms, including their policies, lie between the consumers of
the information (both viewers and third party applications) and the actual infor-
mation. User Centric Policy Management enhances these mechanism. It primarily
consists of Policy Management Assistance Tools with User Centric Characteristics
that enable the user to better manage their access control policies. Our new access
control paradigm provides a more usable access control framework that is effective,
efficient and satisfying to the user. We proposed both Viewer and Application Policy
Management Assistance tools.
Viewer Policy Management Tools:
Policy Manager assists users in managing access to their online information. We
proposed a user centric approach, based on supervised learning mechanisms, to decide
on trust and access control settings for each user’s friends. We incorporated knowledge
from others in the social network to enhance the supervised learning results.
Assisted Friend Grouping leverages proven clustering techniques, with measurable
alignment with user intentions, to assist users in grouping their friends for policy man-
agement purposes. Our approach demonstrated reduced grouping times and improve-
ments in user centric characteristics over traditional group based policy management
approaches.
Same-As Subject Management leverages a user’s memory and opinion of their
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friends to set policies for other similar friends. Our visual policy editor uses friend
recognition and minimal task interruption to obtain substantial reductions in pol-
icy authoring times and more conservative policies. In addition, Same-As Subject
Management was positively perceived by users over traditional group based policy
management approaches.
Example Friend Selection introduces two techniques for aiding users in selecting
their example friends that are used in developing policy templates for Same-As Sub-
ject Management. Both techniques reduced policy authoring times and exhibited
improved user centric characteristics.
Same-As Object Management leverages a user’s memory and perception of their
objects for setting permissions for other similar objects. Our access control frame-
work’s policy management mechanism is more flexible; users were able to author more
expressive policies that aligned with their mental model and intentions. These poli-
cies are also more readable than ones created using more traditional grouping based
access control frameworks. Because of the improved expressiveness and readability,
policies are more conservative (less permissive) resulting in better security. Also, pol-
icy authoring time is reduced and users perceived Same-As Object Management to
be easier to use.
Application Policy Management Tools:
We introduced a general framework describing Social Networks Connect Services
and explored the Facebook Platform, Google Friend Connect, and MySpaceID im-
plementations. We also proposed a number of open research security challenges,
discussing them, presenting select related work, and offering some ideas that may
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lead to solutions.
We presented iLayer : an Application Access Control Framework. Our framework
is based on least privilege and provides web and social networking sites protection
from third party applications. In addition, our framework provides administrators
third party application policy setting functionality, including a policy setting recom-
mendation capability that enhances knowledge in making policy decisions.
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